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ABSTRACT: Decisions like the one to bear or beget a child, to enter into or
disentangle oneself from a long-term relationship or marriage, or to allocate
resources and duties within a family unit are often treated as core choices
constitutive of a person's identity. But many of these individually constitutive
decisions necessarily involve the cooperation of others. One might therefore
suspect that contract law-which operates to fix parties' mutual
commitments-would be a useful tool for securing greater certainty regarding
these important decisions. Nevertheless, courts have often refused to enforce
agreements between intimates concerning such decisions on the grounds that
they violate public policy.
This Article criticizes the use of the public policy doctrine to avoid
enforcement of intimate agreements. It begins with a concrete example of how
courts have used the public policy doctrine to invalidate agreements regarding
the use of assisted reproductive technologies, a realm in which uncertainty can
result in tragic consequences for the users of those technologies. The Article
demonstrates that the appearance of the public policy doctrine in this context is
just the latest instantiation of a longstanding practice of policing the border
between the market and domestic spheres. The extension of the public policy
doctrine to the reproductive realm perpetuates the doctrine's historical
effects-namely, the perpetuation of gender roles that tend to subordinate
women-even as it cloaks courts with power to regulate who can reproduce
and in what circumstances. This judicial policing of the family burdens
minority family units, such as gay and lesbian couples, who in many cases rely
on intimate agreements to structure their lives, and it deprives society of the
benefits that a plurality of family structures can provide. The Article therefore
calls for greater awareness of the myriad ways in which the public policy
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doctrine regulates intimate behavior and increased skepticism regarding its use
in the context of intimate agreements.
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INTRODUCTION
Before the festivities of their summer wedding even came to a close, guests
began peppering the newly married couple with questions: "Are you going to
have kids? When are you going to have kids?"' The couple, two twenty-six-
year-old men, do not plan to have children. But one husband's mother, who
dreams of having grandchildren, has already begun to fantasize about a future
in which both her son and son-in-law will have a biological child with the help
of a surrogate. "'They're young,"' she said. "'Maybe they'll change their
minds."' 2
There has been no shortage of stories in the media involving the expansion
of families through the use of assisted reproductive technologies. In articles
about "having it all," ambitious career women are told to freeze their eggs
while they pursue professional advancement.3 Shows and movies like "The
New Normal," "Baby Mama," and even "The Real Housewives of Beverly
1. Rachel L. Swarns, Male Couples Feel Pressure to Fill Cradles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012, at
Al.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can't Have It All, THE ATLANTIC, July 2012
("I recommend establishing yourself in your career first but still try to have kids before you are 35-or
else freeze your eggs . . . .").
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Hills" have kept the subject of assisted reproductive technologies in the public
eye. The subject even emerged during the 2012 election cycle when Tagg
Romney, the eldest son of the Republican Party's nominee for President, Mitt
Romney, announced the birth of two children through the assistance of a
gestational surrogate.4
Developments in assisted reproductive technologies have multiplied the
choices involved in deciding to have children and have extended them to a
broader range of people. Single women or lesbian couples may choose to
obtain sperm from an anonymous or known donor for intrauterine
insemination.5 Gay couples and other intended parents may use donor eggs to
create embryos that are then carried by a gestational surrogate. Egg freezing
has become an increasingly popular option for professional women facing the
prospect of declining fertility.7 And the in-vitro-fertilization process (LVF), in
which a woman's eggs are extracted, fertilized in a laboratory, and implanted in
a woman's uterus (either her own or another's),8 has skyrocketed in popularity
and success: in 2009, clinics performed 146,244 IVF cycles, resulting in the
birth of 60,190 infants.9
For people using these reproductive technologies, it is a necessary and
routine practice to attempt to secure their respective rights through contracts.
Like the freezing of eggs or embryos, which defers reproduction until some
future time, the law of contracts allows parties to make decisions in advance of
when they may take effect: can a child contact her anonymous sperm donor
father upon turning eighteen? Must a woman abide by her promise to care for a
child conceived by her partner if they later split up? To which spouse should
the court award cryopreserved embryos if the couple divorces?
Tagg Romney, his wife, and their gestational surrogate reportedly entered
into an agreement that attempted to answer some of these difficult questions. It
granted to the surrogate the right to decide to abort the fetus or fetuses "[i]f in
the opinion of the treating physician or her independent obstetrician there is
potential physical harm to the surrogate."10 But it gave the "intended parents"
4. Ashley Parker, 2 New Grandchildren for Romney, With Help of'Surrogate, N.Y. TIMES: THE
CAUCUS (May 4, 2012, 4:53 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/2-new-grandchildren-
for-romney-with-help-of-surrogate.
5. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
10-11 (2011).
6. See id.
7. Rebecca Dana, Ice Queens, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 2012, at 9; Elissa Gootman, So Eager for
Grandchildren, They're Paying the Egg-Freezing Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2012, at Al.
8. see NAT'L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2009 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: SUCCESS RATES,
NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 3-4 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2009/PDF/ART 2009_Full.pdf.
9. Id. at 13.
I0. Mitt Romney s Son Signed 'Abortion' Clause in Surrogate Birth Contract, TMZ.CoM (Sept. 21,
2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.tmz.com/2012/09/20/mitt-romney-son-tagg-abortion-clause-surrogate-
birth-agreement-contract-bill-handel/.
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the right to make the abortion decision "[i]n the event the child is determined to
be physiologically, genetically or chromosomally abnormal," requiring the
surrogate to "abort, or not to abort, in accordance with the intended parents'
decision."I1
Lives are structured around these types of decisions. But people's attempts
to secure their expectations through binding agreements often fail.
Consider the case of B.Z., who endured more than ten years of failed
fertility treatments and two separate ectopic pregnanciesl2 that left her without
either of her fallopian tubes before finally giving birth to twins through IVF.13
After the successful procedure, two vials of leftover embryos remained in
storage.14 Before this last cycle, B.Z. and her husband signed the fertility
clinic's consent form, expressing their preference that the clinic return the
embryos to B.Z. "for implant" if they separated.' 5 When the couple divorced,
B.Z. sought enforcement of the agreement, contending that she wanted
additional children but could not tolerate "yet another decade of treatment."1 6
The court refused to enforce the agreement on public policy grounds,
prohibiting the embryos' use.17
Contracts between intimates governing decisions pertaining to the use of
reproductive technologies are just the latest type of intimate agreements that
many courts have shied away from enforcing on public policy grounds.
Although courts now enforce some types of intimate agreements that they once
placed off-limits, like prenuptial agreements,19 many others-involving the
performance of certain duties of support within an ongoing relationship, child-
II. Id.
12. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1052 n.6 (Mass. 2000) ("An ectopic pregnancy is one that
occurs outside the uterus.").
13. Id. at 1052-53.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1054. The evidence also suggested that although both the husband and wife were present
when the wife completed the consent form specifying this preference before their first procedure, the
husband had signed a blank copy thereafter. Id.
16. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, A.Z, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (No. SJC-08098), 1999 WL
34579095, at *23.
17. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059.
18. By the term "intimates," I refer primarily to adults in a sexual relationship, but also to adults
who share a relationship characterized by emotional vulnerability, cf Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating
Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLuM. L. REV. 1955, 2005
(2010), caring and commitment, and self-identification, cf Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 630-37 (1980). As Laura Rosenbury has persuasively argued, this
category may extend to friends whose relationships are characterized by most of these features. See
Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 203-06, 209-11 (2007). By
"intimate" agreements, I also refer to agreements dealing with matters typically associated with
intimacy, like sexual reproduction, even if they are made between people at arms' length, e.g., surrogacy
contracts.
19. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
65, 70-71 (1998). Courts also generally enforce separation agreements between currently married
spouses seeking divorce. See, e.g., Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)
(recognizing a policy "allowing married couples to resolve their disputes and to order their affairs by
agreement").
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rearing arrangements, or reproductive decisions-still stand a poor chance of
being enforced by courts.20
The invocation of public policy reflects a court's determination that an
agreement is unenforceable not because of any deficiencies in the bargaining
process, but because the substance of an agreement threatens the public good.2 '
When it comes to the realm of intimacy, courts' conceptions of the public good
are often far-reaching, and potential threats-though rarely expressly
identified-can come from many different directions. Courts have theorized,
for example, that "[t]he welfare of society is so deeply interested in the
preservation of the marriage relation, and so fraught with evil is regarded
whatever is calculated to impair its usefulness, or designed to terminate it, that
it has long been the settled policy of the law to guard and maintain it with a
watchful vigilance." 22 Although changing social views have excepted certain
23*types of intimate agreements, marriage and other types of intimate
relationships still persist as a "fulcrum of social control,"24 so judicial use of the
public policy doctrine in this realm remains commonplace.
Based as the public policy doctrine is on a court's conception of the public
25
good, each use of the public policy doctrine to decline enforcement of an
intimate agreement reveals a court's normative commitments regarding the
subject matter of the agreement.26 This Article charts the landscape of these
commitments, starting with agreements between intimates for the use of
reproductive technologies, and then stepping back to look at other types of
intimate agreements.
Family law scholars and legal historians have paid extensive attention to
the courts' refusal to bring contract law into the domestic sphere and this
refusal's historical effect of undervaluing the contributions of women.27 In the
20. As in most areas of the law, states differ on how actively they use the public policy doctrine to
avoid enforcement of these intimate agreements.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. b (1981) (describing the "need to
protect some aspect of the public welfare").
22. Phillips v. Thorp, 10 Or. 494, 495 (1883) (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970) (allowing enforcement of prenuptial
agreements notwithstanding marriage's role as the "foundation of the familial and social structure of our
Nation" in light of the "commonplace fact of life" of divorce).
24. Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the
Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1903 (1998).
25. For the purposes of this Article, I do not take issue with policies emanating directly from
legislative enactments, but rather policies resulting from the extension of statutes into new areas not
expressly contemplated by the legislature. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178 cmt. a,
179 cmt. a (1981) (noting the broad range of legislation-including statutes, ordinances, and
administrative regulations-and judicially created policies that can serve as the basis for a public policy
against enforcement of agreements). Although attempts by legislatures to govem intimate relationships
may raise their own substantive concerns, I focus here on instances ofjudicial lawmaking. See also injia
notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Parts I.A., I.B.
27. See, e.g., Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
189, 265-67 (2011) (summarizing the history of this critique); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and
Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 499-501 (2005) (discussing courts' justification for this
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process, they have studied particular applications of the public policy doctrine,
for example, to surrogacy contracts or prenuptial agreements,28 and have
critiqued certain foundational assumptions underlying the division between the
family and the market.29 Contracts scholars have likewise called for broader
enforcement of intimate agreements, describing how such a regime might be
implemented and providing normative justifications for increased contractual
freedom in this realm.30 But to this point, both camps have paid less attention to
how public policy functions as a contract doctrine in these agreements and how
its sustained use across different forms of intimate agreements polices the
boundaries of the family. As a result, scholars have from time to time endorsed
the use of public policy to invalidate classes of agreements they find
problematic without examining the further implications of the policies they
have advocated.31
This Article takes up that project. I demonstrate how cases involving
modem reproductive technologies have revitalized policies from a time when
courts expected a wife to "discharge marital duties in loving and devoted
ministrations." 32 Reconceived to protect individual freedom by preventing
individuals from making binding agreements on quintessentially private
matters, these policies continue to preserve traditional family roles33 by
reinforcing gender norms that have persisted across centuries. These norms
limit social approval of a broader range of individual choices pertaining to
intimate matters and reinforce structural gender inequalities.34
exclusion); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2181-2206 (1994) (charting the development of doctrines
rendering agreements between husband and wife unenforceable).
28. See, e.g., Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and flow We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 150-58 (1998)
(discussing prenuptial agreements); June R. Carbone, The Role of Contract Principles in Determining
the Validity ofSurrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581 (1988) (discussing surrogacy).
29. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 27, at 493 (challenging the assumption that the law does not
already permit economic exchange between intimates).
30. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A
New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 213 (1982). But see Silbaugh, supra note 19, at 69
(accepting nonenforcement based on public policy as a fact and then arguing for nonenforcement of all
intimate agreements).
31. The support by many family law scholars of a public policy against the enforcement of
surrogacy agreements is a prime example of this phenomenon. But this tactic has been a double-edged
sword. In recent years, several scholars have observed the role of the public policy argument against
surrogacy in the limiting of abortion rights. I take up this discussion in Section II.B infra.
32. Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 25 (1883).
33. By "traditional family," I mean the core unit of a husband and wife involving some degree of
sexual affiliation, with or without children. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 110 (2004).
34. See, e.g., Ariela R. Dubler, Balancing Work and Family Is Not Just the Responsibility of
Women, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/21/opinion/la-oe-dubler-
women-romney-20121021 (criticizing presidential candidate Mitt Romney's woman-specific flex-time
proposal as reifying the disproportionate amount of childcare done by mothers in two-career families);
see also infra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
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That being said, use of the public policy doctrine in the intimate context
takes a particular toll on people seeking to create nontraditional family
relationships. By refusing to bind parties to their initial commitments, courts
create uncertainty with respect to the parties' rights and obligations. Within the
reproductive context, for example, those who must rely on assisted
reproductive technologies-gay and lesbian couples and the infertile, single, or
otherwise-face a double bind: the public policy doctrine declares that the
decision to become a genetic parent is a highly valued, individually constitutive
choice while denying the security that comes from legal enforcement of such
decisions precisely in order to protect that freedom.35 Through a close
examination of the public policy doctrine in the context of agreements
regarding reproduction, I aim to reveal how the doctrine has evolved to police
new configurations of intimate relationships and intimate decisionmaking,
declaring certain choices legitimate or illegitimate. I therefore call for greater
suspicion of the use of the doctrine in the intimate context.
Although agreements regarding the use of assisted reproductive
technologies are the focus of this Article, they exemplify but one instance of a
larger project of policing undertaken through the public policy doctrine that I
expose here. In Part I, I examine several courts' recent use of the public
policy doctrine to decline to enforce agreements between spouses providing for
the disposition of cryopreserved embryos. I uncover the troubling nineteenth-
century roots of the sources relied on by the courts in extending the doctrine to
this contemporary context, and demonstrate that neither the use of public policy
in this context nor the specific policies themselves were preordained. In doing
so, I reveal that the use of public policy can frustrate parties' expectations and
result in the substitution of courts' preferences, even in the realm of
reproductive decisionmaking.
Part II performs a backward-looking and cross-substantive analysis of
public policies used to deny enforcement of intimate agreements. In it, I
demonstrate the connection between policies invoked in the embryo disposition
cases and policies historically designed to separate the market and domestic
spheres and fuse the identities of woman and mother. Although history places
assisted reproductive technologies and coverture worlds apart, I demonstrate
how the courts' response to modem technologies can reveal the persistence of
traditional gender stereotypes.
35. See infra Subsection I.B.2.
36. I do not mean to suggest that all courts share a common vision regarding intimate relations and
the public policy doctrine's role in shaping it. In fact, across jurisdictions and times, courts have
answered similar questions differently, sometimes approving agreements that other courts disapproved.
Neither do I attribute these decisions to the subjective motivations of individual judges. As Ariela
Dubler has pointed out, "cases unfortunately offer quite limited insight into the subjective motivations of
their cast of characters." Dubler, supra note 24, at 1888. Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to deny
the existence of a pattern of regulation-subject, of course, to exceptions-dating back centuries and
continuing to this day.
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In Part 1II, I tie public-policy-based decisions regulating who can
reproduce and in what circumstances to other contemporary applications of the
public policy doctrine in intimate contexts. The historical effect of these
policies has been to deny women equal access to property ownership and the
workplace, and through its extension to agreements in the reproductive context,
the public policy doctrine continues to reinforce gender roles that perpetuate
inequalities. But the doctrine exacts a particular burden on nontraditional
family structures by injecting uncertainty into their legal relationships and
declaring their configurations harmful to the public good. I suggest several
ways in which the disapproval of innovative intimate arrangements deprives
society of the antitotalitarian benefits that a pluralistic institution of the family
can provide.
Despite the problems with the public policy doctrine in the intimate-
agreement context, agreements of the type I analyze in this Article sometimes
raise concerns about unfairness, commodification, and oppression. In Part IV, I
briefly explore whether these concerns justify the use of the public policy
doctrine. In light of the doctrine's complicity in maintaining gender hierarchies
and status privileges, I suggest that the answer to that question is no.
I. PUBLIC POLICY AND AGREEMENTS REGARDING FROZEN EMBRYOS
This Part examines the evolution of a public policy disfavoring "forced
procreation" against a person's contemporaneous wishes,37 resulting in the
nonenforcement of agreements for the use of cryopreserved embryos. 38 I first
present the facts of three key cases, and I then analyze the policies used by the
courts to ignore the parties' preferences for the use of their frozen embryos.
A. The Agreements
A.Z. v. B.Z.39 Within three years of her marriage to A.Z. in 1977, B.Z.
suffered an ectopic pregnancy resulting in a miscarriage and the removal of her
left fallopian tube.40 In the early 1980s, the couple went through a fruitless year
37. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000); see also In re Marriage of Witten, 672
N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003) (stating that "it would be against the public policy of this state to enforce
a prior agreement between the parties in this highly personal area of reproductive choice"); J.B. v. M.B.,
783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001) (protecting the right of a contracting party to "change his or her mind ...
up to the point of use or destruction of any stored preembryos").
38. Not all courts to consider similar disputes have refused to enforce such agreements. See, e.g.,
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (enforcing an embryo disposition agreement); Roman v.
Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006) (same); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002) (en
banc) (same). The courts are about evenly split as to whether the public policy doctrine should apply.
Over forty state supreme courts have yet to consider the issue.
39. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1051.
40. Id. at 1052.
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of unspecified fertility treatments.41 After moving to Massachusetts for work
about eight years later, B.Z. and A.Z. once again sought to conceive through
the use of assisted reproductive technologies. They first chose the Gamete
Inter-Fallopian Transfer procedure, involving the simultaneous transfer of eggs
and sperm into B.Z.'s fallopian tube. Instead of implanting in her uterus,
however, the fertilized embryo lodged in her remaining fallopian tube,
requiring its removal. 42 Left with no fallopian tubes and no other options, the
couple turned to IVF. They underwent seven cycles of IVF over the course of
three years until B.Z. finally conceived and later gave birth to twin daughters in
1992, fifteen years after the couple married.43
Before each cycle, the IVF clinic required the couple to sign a consent
form concerning the ultimate disposition of any frozen embryos that would
result from the process.44 That form explained the general nature of the IVF and
cryopreservation processes, including the potential benefits and risks of
cryopreservation. 45 The form also required the donors to decide the disposition
of leftover frozen embryos on the occurrence of certain contingencies,
including the wife or donor reaching menopause; the death of one or both of the
46donors; or separation. A.Z. and B.Z. completed and signed the first of these
consent forms together.47 The form, filled out by B.Z., stated that if they
"should become separated, they both agreed to have the embryo[s] returned to
the wife for implant." 48 For each subsequent cycle, the husband signed a blank
consent form and the wife wrote in substantially similar language to what she
wrote on the first form.49
Their last, successful, IVF cycle yielded eight extra embryos, which the
clinic cryopreserved.so In 1995, without telling her husband, B.Z. attempted to
use some of the embryos to have additional children, and her husband only
found out about the procedure through a notice from his insurance company.
Needless to say, the relationship between the two deteriorated around this
time.52 During divorce proceedings, B.Z. sought to enforce the consent form,
which provided her the remaining embryos in the event of their separation,
while her husband sought an order permanently enjoining her from "using" the
remaining embryos. 53 The court concluded that several deficiencies in the form
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1053.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1054.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting consent form).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1053.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1053, 1055.
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undermined its enforceability as a contract between A.Z. and B.Z.54 It also held
that the agreement violated a public policy that "individuals shall not be
compelled to enter into intimate family relationships, and that the law shall not
be used as a mechanism for forcing such relationships when they are not
desired."55 The court therefore left in place a permanent injunction barring
B.Z.'s use of the embryos.56
57J.B. v. M.B. Early in her marriage to M.B., J.B. discovered that she had a
condition preventing her from becoming pregnant.58 Before undergoing IVF,
the fertility clinic presented J.B. and M.B. with a consent form that described
the IVF procedure and the purpose of cryopreservation and prompted the
patient and her partner to execute an "attached legal statement regarding
control and disposition of cryopreserved embryos."59 The signed form stated
that the control, direction, and ownership of their "tissues" would be
"relinquished to the IVF Program" in the event of "[a] dissolution of [their]
marriage by court order, unless the court specifies who takes control and
direction of the tissues." 60 The form further allowed the parties to change their
intended disposition in writing.61
The clinic created eleven embryos, implanting some and cryopreserving
the remainder.62 Shortly after J.B. became pregnant and gave birth to the
63
couple's daughter, the couple separated. At that time, J.B. told her husband
that she wanted to discard the remaining embryos.64 In her divorce petition
filed a few months later, she sought an order from the court regarding the
remaining embryos.65 M.B. sought a contrary order compelling his wife to
allow the remaining embryos to be implanted or donated to other infertile
couples.66 In support of his motion, he stated that they had many serious
discussions regarding the use of IVF, as a result of which they agreed prior to
undergoing the procedure that any unused embryos would not be destroyed, but
would be used or donated. He asserted that this agreement reflected his
ethical and moral beliefs as a Catholic, and that his wife came up with the idea
68to donate the embryos to encourage his participation. He also provided
54. Id. at 1057.
55. Id. at 1059.
56. Id. at 1052, 1059.
57. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
58. Id. at 709.
59. Id. at 709-10 (quoting consent form).
60. Id. at 710.
61. Id. at 713.
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certifications from his family members corroborating this account.69 His wife
disputed that they ever had a discussion regarding the disposition of frozen
embryos in the event of dissolution and claimed that she only ever intended to
use the embryos in the context of an intact family.70
Like the A.Z. court, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressed doubts about
the existence of a binding agreement between the spouses, finding the language
of the consent form to be too conditional to evince a clear intent on the part of
the spouses, 7 and rejecting M.B.'s evidence of a contrary oral agreement on
the ground that the parties would have had to change their disposition in
writing.72 But the court went on to analyze whether embryo disposition
agreements could ever be enforced in the state, and it adopted a rule that
"public policy concerns that underlie limitations on contracts involving family
relationships are protected by permitting either party to object at a later date to
provisions specifying a disposition of preembryos that the party no longer
accepts." 73 Under this approach, if a party reconsiders an earlier choice
regarding use of the embryos, the courts will evaluate the interests of both
parties, normally favoring the party seeking to avoid genetic parenthood.74
Performing that weighing in this case, the court agreed with the Appellate
Division that because M.B. was already a father, and capable of fathering more
children, the remaining embryos should be destroyed or stored indefinitely at
his expense.
In re Marriage of Witten. 7 Like the women in the previous two cases,
Tamera Witten was unable to conceive children naturally, and, with her
husband Trip, she turned to IVF in order to become pregnant.7 7 Tamera and
Trip, as well as a representative of the fertility clinic, signed an informed
consent document titled "Embryo Storage Agreement," which provided that the
embryos would be used for transfer, release, or disposition "only with the
signed approval of both Client Depositors."78 The agreement had only one
exception to the joint-approval requirement: death of one or both of the
depositors.79 It also provided for the termination of the clinic's responsibility to
continue to store the embryos if the depositors provided written authorization to
release or destroy them, both depositors died, the depositors failed to pay the
storage fee, or ten years elapsed from the date of the agreement.80
69. Id.at711.
70. Id. at 710.
71. Id. at 713.
72. Id. at 714.
73. Id. at 719.
74. Id. at 718-20.
75. Id. at 720.
76. 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
77. Id. at 772.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 772.
80. Id.
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Unlike the couples in the prior two cases, the IVF process did not work for
the Wittens despite several embryo transfer attempts. ' At the time of their
dissolution action, they had seventeen cryopreserved embryos in storage at the
clinic.82 As a thirty-six-year-old woman with a history of infertility, Tamera
saw the embryos as her "last chance for a biological baby,"83 and testified that
she would afford Trip the opportunity to exercise his parental rights or to have
his rights terminated.84 She also adamantly opposed the destruction of the
embryos. Trip, meanwhile, testified at trial that he did not want the embryos
destroyed, but that he did not want Tamera to have them either.86 The parties
presented multiple grounds upon which the court could grant their requested
relief, importantly, for our purposes, Tamera sought to invalidate the storage
agreement because it would require Trip's consent for any future use of the
embryos, while Trip sought its enforcement.87
Finding that the storage agreement addressed the situation at hand, the
court considered its enforceability on public policy grounds. Similar to the
previous two cases, the court noted that it "would be against the public policy
of this state to enforce a prior agreement between the parties in this highly
personal area of reproductive choice when one of the parties has changed his or
her mind concerning the disposition or use of the embryos." 89 The solution, it
held, was to require contemporaneous mutual consent for the transfer, release,
disposition, or use of the embryos. 90 Recognizing that its solution could result
in a metaphorical deep-freeze unless the parties arrived at a subsequent mutual
agreement, the court also noted that storage costs should be borne by the party
seeking to prolong the embryos' storage (here, both Tamera and Trip), and that
the clinic would only be obligated to store the embryos until the expiration of
its contract with the other parties.9' This solution left Tamera's reproductive
future in the uncooperative hands of her ex-husband.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Brief of Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 8, Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768.
84. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 772.
85. Id. at 772-73.
86. Id. at 773.
87. Id. at 779.
88. Id. at 773.
89. Id. at 781.
90. Id. at 783.
91. Id. Because it is unlikely that most fertility clinics would agree to store frozen embryos
indefinitely, this approach effectively creates a default rule of termination upon the expiration of the
parties' storage contract. The operation of various default rules created by the public policy decisions in
these three cases is beyond the scope of this Article but warrants further consideration.
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B. The Policies in Context
1. State Regulation of Intimacy
The use of the public policy doctrine to avoid enforcement of embryo
disposition agreements in the foregoing trio of decisions is at least somewhat
surprising, because it takes place in front of a backdrop of contractual freedom
and involves choices typically characterized as highly personal. The essence of
contract law involves enforcement of voluntary private choices allocating value
and risk.92 The bargain principle in contract law 93 presumes that "[p]arties are
normally the best judges of their own utility, and normally reveal their
determinations of utility in their promises. Bargain promises are normally made
in a deliberative manner for personal gain . . . ."94
Although this view of personal decisionmaking is unrealistically
optimistic,95 it is also undoubtedly true that the vehicle of contract allows
parties to achieve goals that they could not accomplish without it. The binding
nature of the promise enables a party to secure a reciprocal commitment from
the other party, allowing both to achieve their goals more easily than if one
party could renege at no (or low) cost.96 Without contract law, parties cannot
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, intro. note (1981) ("Contract law has
traditionally relied in large part upon the premise that the parties should be able to make legally
enforceable agreements on their own terms, freely arrived at by the process of bargaining."); Shultz,
supra note 30, at 213; Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 302-03 (arguing that where
intentions regarding procreative arrangements are "deliberate, explicit and bargained for, . .. they should
be honored"). By emphasizing voluntariness, I exclude from this discussion agreements that are the
products of defects in the bargaining process. Although I am sympathetic to the argument that certain
reproductive decisions may be the product of systematic defects or structural inequalities, those concems
are not always present in intimate agreements.
93. A bargain refers to "an exchange in which each party views the performance that he undertakes
as the price of the performance undertaken by the other." Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain
Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 742 (1982).
94. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.
211, 211-12 (1995).
95. Like many scholars, I view any assumption of perfect rationality with suspicion, see, e.g.,
Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1257-58 (1998)
(offering a critique of the rational choice assumption), and acknowledge that individual choices may be
predetermined to some degree, see, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read
Martha Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 167, 175 (2000) (arguing that choices like
marriage are really constrained by social conditions). But my argument does not depend on an
assumption of perfect rationality. That is because the use of public policy in this context categorically
eliminates the ability of parties to make enforceable ex ante decisions regarding reproduction. It is
therefore an inappropriate context in which to address concerns about the limits of rational
decisionmaking absent evidence of categorical irrationality. In a future work, I will explore more fully
which choices can be legitimately associated with a decisionmaker based on the nature of those choices
and the effect of the intervening passage of time.
96. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1255 (1998); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND 13 (1998) (describing
contracting as the exchange of promises for the purpose of getting "something that you want"); Shultz,
supra note 30, at 214 (observing that the "freedom to pursue individualization and diversity that
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secure commitments from each other that both might consider necessary to
embark on a venture.97
That said, although individuals generally have the power to govern their
affairs as they see fit through the execution of legally enforceable agreements,98
courts have long limited freedom of contract when enforcement of an
agreement would harm the public interest. 99 This history of courts' use of
public policy to resolve legal disputes extends back to the "dawn" of the
English legal system, "when law had to be made in some way or other, and
when there was not much statute law and practically no case law at all to
summon to the judges' assistance."' 00 From its origins, the doctrine sought to
preserve the "public weal" or the "inviolate" nature of the "social fabric"' 0'
from the injurious influence of private interests.102 By focusing on an
agreement's effect on the public welfare rather than considering aspects of the
bargaining process, the public policy doctrine is more accurately described as
"a principle of judicial legislation"'103 than a traditional contract defense. The
refusal to enforce an agreement has been justified as a punishment in itself, and
also a deterrent to future unsavory conduct.104
characterizes private ordering" involves "yesterday's legally binding private choice . . . overrid[ing]
today's contrary private choice").
97. See Scott & Scott, supra note 96, at 1232 ("A legal regime that constrains the freedom to
commit actually limits individual freedom.").
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, intro. note (1981); Robert Braucher,
Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598, 598 (1969) (describing the
"increased respect accorded to freedom of contract" in the draft version of the Second Restatement of
Contracts).
99. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (3d ed. 2004); see also
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510 (1934) (recognizing that although "the making of contracts is
normally [a] matter[] of private and not of public concern ... government cannot exist if the citizen may
at his will . . . exercise his freedom of contract to work [his fellows] harm").
100. Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 77
(1928); see also id. at 85-86 (noting the use of the public policy doctrine "as early as Elizabeth" to
invalidate agreements in restraint of trade, and citing examples of other types of agreements in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
101. Thomas H. Breeze, The Attitude of Public Policy Towards the Contracts of Heirs Expectant
and Reversioner, 13 YALE L.J. 228, 228 (1904).
102. See Winfield, supra note 100, at 82-83 (citing the commentaries of Sir Thomas de Littleton,
Sir Edward Coke, and others).
103. Winfield, supra note 100, at 92 (quotation marks omitted).
104. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17
GEO. MASON L. REV. 483, 483-84 (2010) (criticizing the remedy of nonenforcement as disconnected
from the justifications for nonenforcement); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient
Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 118-20 & n.9 (1988) (noting
arguments both suggesting and questioning the existence of deterrence); Note, A Law and Economics
Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2006) [hereinafter Note, Law
and Economics] ("[R]efusal to enforce such contracts deters their formation, which benefits public
welfare."). Of course, the deterrent effect of decisions not to enforce a particular agreement on public
policy grounds cannot easily be measured and might depend on a variety of factors, from the likelihood
that parties expect to enforce similar agreements in court to the availability of extra-legal mechanisms
for enforcement. See id. at 1448. It might also be possible that-at least for certain types of agreements
including agreements between intimates-a policy of non-enforceability would not have a consistent or
measurable deterrent effect.
Public Policing of Intimate Agreements
Traditionally, courts invalidated most intimate agreements because of their
suspicion of any legal relationship that could undermine the institution of
marriage, "the foundation of the familial and social structure of our Nation."
0 5
In explaining the longstanding refusal to allow divorce by consent of the
parties, one court observed that "in every divorce suit the state is a third party
whose interests take precedence over the private interests of the spouses." 06
Public policies against the enforcement of intimate agreements therefore
developed to protect the public's interest in upholding the sanctity of the
marital relationship and regulating morality in matters of sex and intimacy. 0 7
The Restatement (First) of Contracts, published in 1932, devoted nine
sections to different categories of impermissible agreements: Bargain in
Restraint of Marriage, Marriage Brokerage, Bargain for Custody of Minor
Children, Bargain for Separation or Maintenance, Bargain for Reconciliation,
Bargain Facilitating Divorce, Bargain to Change Essential Obligations of
Marriage, Bargain by One Already Married to Marry Another, and Bargain for
Immoral Sex Relations. os As is evident from their titles, these sections identify
policies that protected the status of marriage by disallowing changes to its
duties, prohibiting agreements interfering with entrance into marriage or
inducing separation or divorce, and hindering the development of marriage-like
relationships. 19 Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts streamlined
its treatment of this topic, it too recognized the continued limits on the "power
of individuals by legally enforceable private agreement to alter the incidents of
marriage or to shape legal relationships within the family."' t0
The boundaries of these broad, court-created limitations on enforcement of
intimate agreements are not fixed, but shift from time to time to encompass or
exclude new types of agreements, as the next section will demonstrate.
105. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970).
106. Id. at 383.
107. FARNSWORTH, supra note 99, § 5.4 (noting the traditional importance of marriage and the use
of public policies to guard against the "impairment of family relations"); JOANNA L. GROSSMAN &
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA
209-10 (2011) (noting courts' suspicion of the power of private agreements to change the status of
marriage); Note, Marriage, Contracts, and Public Policy, 54 HARV. L. REV. 473, 473 (1941)
[hereinafter Note, Marriage, Contracts]. As innumerable critics have demonstrated, the regulation of the
marital relationship went hand-in-hand with the regulation of sex. See, e.g., K. N. Llewellyn, Behind the
Law of Divorce. I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1297-98 (1932) (identifying as a function of marriage the
organization of sexual relations into permissible and impermissible forms).
108. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 581-89 (1932).
109. Contracts in restraint of marriage were thought to pose an undue temptation on young men and
women to engage in sexual relations outside of the marital relationship. Likewise, courts declined to
enforce agreements between cohabitants on the grounds that they might "weaken marriage as the
foundation of our family-based society" by encouraging cohabitation, Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d
1204, 1207 (111. 1979), itself a crime in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Premarital agreements
were also discouraged on the grounds that they might provide an economic incentive for spouses to
divorce. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, at 210.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 3, intro. note (1981).
2013] 173
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
1. Forging a Public Policy Against Forced Procreation
All three of the embryo disposition cases discussed above refused to
enforce agreements between spouses expressing future preferences regarding
the use of their cryopreserved embryos. In the absence of state statutes
addressing the use of assisted reproductive technologies or the enforceability of
such contracts,112 the courts looked to older policies used to invalidate other
types of intimate agreements and to evolving constitutional norms expressing a
preference for individual freedom in personal decisionmaking.
Policies Designed to Protect the Institution of Marriage. To justify the
existence of a policy favoring contemporaneous choice regarding procreation,
the courts first pointed to statutes or prior decisions preventing parties from
contractually binding themselves to enter or exit family relationships and to
policies refusing to resolve disputes between intimates. These policies, the
court suggested, protected choice by preventing adults from being "forced" by
agreement to enter or exit intimate relationships.
For instance, the courts identified statutes abolishing the cause of action for
breach of promise to marryll3 and public policies in their states against the
enforcement of agreements to abandon a marriage.1 4 The cause of action for
breach of promise to marry "was a remedy for respectable, mostly middle-class
women-women (above all) who had been seduced and abandoned."" 5
Designed to compensate women for the injury being jilted would cause to their
value on the marriage market, this cause of action was eventually repealed by
legislatures in order to protect the institution of marriage from what had
become widely seen as a greater threat from abuse of the action by gold-diggers
and extortionists. 16 Similarly, the refusal to enforce agreements to abandon a
marriage stemmed from an interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage even
over the wishes of spouses who no longer wished to remain married rather than
111. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,
1058 (Mass. 2000); J.B v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001).
112. See, e.g., A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1055; J.B., 783 A.2d at 718 n.8.
113. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 47A); J.B., 783 A.2d at 717-18
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1).
114. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059.
115. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, at 90. Because the cause of action was designed
primarily to compensate a woman for the opportunity costs of being off the marriage market in her
prime years, actions for breach of promise would not typically result in a compelled marriage. See id. at
92-93. But see Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 23-37 (2012) (noting
that marriage was sometimes used as an alternative punishment for the crime of seduction, presumably
resulting in some unwanted marriages).
116. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, at 96-100; Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative
Attack on "Heart Balm, " 33 MICH. L. REV. 979, 983-84 (1935) (cataloging abuses of the breach-of-
promise cause of action); see also Segal v. Lynch, 993 A.2d 1229, 1236 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) (noting that the Heart Balm Act "was intended to eliminate the abuses attending the so-called
'heart balm' actions-alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of promise to
marry") (citation and quotation marks omitted). Freedom of contemporaneous choice for the breaching
party does not seem to have been the legislatures' concern.
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any solicitude for individual choice.1 7 By reinventing these older policies
protecting the institution of marriage as policies protecting individual choice,
the courts breathed new life into policies that had largely fallen into desuetude.
The courts also relied on the perceived unsavoriness of resolving disputes
regarding "intimate questions inherent in personal relationships.", For
example, the Witten court pointed to a nineteenth-century case, Miller v.
Miller,''9 in which a wife sued her husband for breach of an agreement
requiring him to pay her $200 per year in monthly installments as long as she
upheld the terms of their interspousal agreement obligating her to "keep her
home and family in a comfortable and reasonably good condition," among
other things.120 The Witten court spoke approvingly of the statement in Miller
that
[i]t is the genius of our laws, as well as of our civilization, that matters
pertaining so directly and exclusively to the home, and its value as
such, and which are so generally susceptible of regulation and control
by those influences which surround it, are not to become matters of
public concern or inquiry.' 2'
It advanced this family-protective rationale even though the agreement
involved the creation by and storage of frozen embryos in a fertility clinic,
not the performance of matters within the home.122
Policies Regarding Reproductive and Parental Decisionmaking. The
courts also looked to more recent state statutes and policies regulating the
termination of parental status as the basis of a right to change one's mind
117. See supra note 115; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 586 & illus. 1 (1932)
(noting that an agreement between married spouses to obtain a divorce is illegal). The policy against
enforcing contracts encouraging divorce was to discourage divorce from occurring, not to save a good
marriage that would otherwise be torn apart. In A.Z., for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court cited an earlier decision in which it refused to enforce a man's promise to support a woman and
her children as consideration for her promise to end her marriage. 725 N.E.2d at 1059 (citing Capazzoli
v. Holzwasser, 490 N.E.2d 420, 426 (Mass. 1986)). Similarly, in In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa
Supreme Court looked to a century-old case in which an attorney and detective entered into an
agreement with a husband to secure a divorce from his wife, who had already planned to initiate divorce
proceedings. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003) (citing Barngrover v.
Pettigrew, 104 N.W. 904, 904 (Iowa 1904)). The spouses in these cases had already decided to end their
marriages; the policy of nonenforcement therefore had nothing to do with protecting their freedom of
choice.
118. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781.
119. 42 N.W. 641 (Iowa 1889).
120. Id. at 641.
121. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781 (quoting Miller, 42 N.W. at 642).
122. For these reasons, a prominent scholar has argued that this rationale for nonenforcement of
embryo disposition agreements is inadequate. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic
Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1171-72 (2008) (arguing that an embryo disposition contract differs
from agreements that involve the difficulty of supervising performance or threat of defective
performance).
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regarding reproductive decisions. These policies have commonly arisen in two
circumstances: adoption and surrogacy.
All three states in the above cases impose brief waiting periods during
which a woman may change her mind before surrendering her child for
adoption. In Massachusetts, for example, "no mother may agree to surrender
her child [for adoption] 'sooner than the fourth calendar day after the date of
birth' . . . regardless of any prior agreement."l23 New Jersey likewise disfavors
private-placement adoptions124 and prevents a mother from consenting to the
surrender of her child until three days after its birth,125 and an Iowa statute
imposes a seventy-two-hour waiting period after the birth of a child before
parents can terminate their parental rights.126
Relatedly, the supreme courts of both Massachusetts and New Jersey have
recognized a public policy against enforcement of surrogacy agreements that
allow the birth mother a short window of time in which to reconsider a decision
to give up the child.127
The waiting periods imposed by these statutes and decisions all protect
individuals from making improvident decisions about the termination of
parental status. But the courts reasoned that the waiting periods likewise should
provide individuals the opportunity to change their minds regarding decisions
about entrance into family relationships, here not limited to a short period of
time but extending indefinitely.128
Finally, to support the policy against forced procreation, the courts also
invoked the freedom to make procreational decisions without state interference
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut,129 Eisenstadt v. Baird,130 Roe v.
Wade,131 and related state court decisions.132 The courts identified in those
decisions a right to procreational autonomy that could protect a person's
decision to reconsider becoming a genetic parent even over his or her prior
commitments to the contrary. 33
123. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2
(1999)).
124. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 718 (N.J. 2001).
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(e) (West 2012).
126. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781.
127. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
128. See, e.g., A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059.
129. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (regarding the use of contraceptives by married spouses).
130. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (access to contraceptives by single persons).
131. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
132. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding that the "right of procreation,"
although protected by the federal and state constitutions, would not be infringed by its decision not to
enforce a surrogacy agreement); Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 132-33 (Mass. 1974) (declining to
recognizing a husband's right to interfere with his wife's decision to have an abortion).
133. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 716 (N.J. 2001) (citing decisions involving the use of
contraception, the right to undergo sterilization, and the choice not to give birth to a child with a genetic
defect); see also In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Iowa 2003) (calling family and
reproductive decisions "highly emotional in nature and subject to a later change of heart"); A.Z. v. B.Z.,
725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (invoking the Supreme Court's recognition of a "'freedom of
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The courts wove together the foregoing policy strands to form a new policy
against the enforcement of embryo disposition agreements between
intimates. 134 In so doing, the courts engaged in a troubling alchemy, extending
arguably anachronistic views about family and gender relations to a new
context and twisting constitutional guarantees of freedom to limit, rather than
enhance, choice. As I will discuss in the next Part, the use of public policy to
regulate assisted reproductive technologies builds on, and helps to propagate,
the policing of other forms of intimacy performed by the doctrine.
II. REGULATING INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
THROUGH THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
Nonenforcement of intimate agreements denies people all the advantages
contract law is thought to provide in their efforts to structure important life
relationships such as marriage, cohabitation, and parenthood. Yet as we saw
with the embryo disposition agreements discussed in the previous Part, courts
often employ policies against enforcement of agreements affecting the entrance
into, exit from, or governance of intimate relationships and the family. Indeed,
as many others have observed, courts usually only enforce the provisions
governing property, and even then do so only when a relationship is at its
end. 135
Courts rely on the character of intimate relationships to justify
nonenforcement of these contracts, but the nonenforcement of contracts
simultaneously helps to constitute which relationships the law considers
"intimate." 36 By keeping certain relations outside of the market, the law
performs a sorting function, dividing the spheres of the market and the home,
and separating the legitimate and illegitimate. 37  It also perpetuates
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life') (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 499 (1977)).
134. All three courts suggested that the agreements would be enforceable against the fertility
clinics. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058 n.22 (recognizing the "essential" role agreements between users
and clinics play in clinic operations and declaring "no impediment to the enforcement of such
contracts"); J.B., 783 A.2d at 719 (noting the "need for agreements between the participants and the
clinics that perform the procedure"); Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 782 (declaring disposition agreements
"between a couple on the one side and the medical facility on the other" to be valid).
135. See Mary Anne Case, Enfbrcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y
225, 227 (2011) (noting the reluctance of courts to enforce contracts in an ongoing marriage); Hasday,
supra note 27, at 499-500 (same); Silbaugh, supra note 19, at 71 (noting the differential treatment of
monetary and non-monetary terms).
136. See Hasday, supra note 27, at 493 ("The legal system also attempts to mark intimate relations
as different, in part by claiming that they are separate from the market."). The fact that the embryo
disposition agreements in A.Z., J.B., and Witten could not be enforced between intimates, but would be
enforceable against the fertility clinics, demonstrates the separation of spheres at work.
137. Id. at 494 (discussing the differentiation between wives and prostitutes); see also Melissa
Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life,
94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2009) (observing that "[h]istorically, criminal law and family law have
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expectations about gender and family roles that originated at a time when
women had markedly less power and when the single authorized sexual
relationship was heterosexual marriage.
Scholars have long criticized the role that the separation of market and
home spheres has played in perpetuating social inequalityl38 and in regulating
interactions between intimates.139 But they have paid less attention to how the
public policy doctrine has policed the borders of intimate relationships and
imposed its normative preferences. Although choices regarding the use of
reproductive technologies may seem distinct from agreements regarding
spousal duties or creating alternative adult relationships, the regulation of all
aspects of intimate behavior, including (a)sexual reproduction, is mutually
reinforcing.140
In this Part, I will demonstrate that the public policies against enforcement
of embryo disposition agreements and other agreements pertaining to assisted
reproductive technologies preserve traditional gender and family roles by
limiting the power of individuals to control their reproductive destiny. Here, I
make two related critiques: first, that seemingly innocuous policies like the
policy against compelled procreation actively reinforce traditional family forms
and gender roles; and second, that changing public policies obscure the broader
project of social regulation that the doctrine performs.
A. Reinforcing Separate Spheres
Both statusl41 and the justifications for status privileges may change over
time. But the movements of status and its justifications are not synchronized.
When the legitimacy of a particular status regime is successfully contested,
lawmakers may find "new rules and reasons to protect such status privileges as
they choose to defend" through a process that Reva Siegel has called
worked in tandem to produce a binary view of intimate life that categorizes intimate acts and choices as
either legitimate marital behavior or illegitimate criminal behavior").
138. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 27, at 265-67 (summarizing the history of this critique); Siegel,
supra note 27, at 2181-2206 (charting the development of doctrines rendering agreements between
husband and wife unenforceable).
139. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 27, at 492-93 (noting that the law in fact countenances limited
types of economic exchange between intimates); Murray, supra note 137, at 1256 (challenging the
conventional wisdom recognizing criminal law's exclusion from the home as inaccurate and observing
the criminal law's longstanding role in the regulation of intimacy); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth ofState
Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 837 (1985) (arguing that the state takes an
active role in the regulation of families); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 5-6
(2006) (observing the entrance of the criminal law into the "quintessentially private space" of the home).
140. Karl Llewellyn recognized this point over eighty years ago when he illustrated the connection
between the regulation of sex and other functions of marriage such as possession of both property and
persons, legitimacy and inheritance, physical health, and morals. Llewellyn, supra note 107, at 1297-
1300.
141. By "status," I mean the position a person holds under the law and in society, as measured by
the sum total of his or her legal rights, duties, liabilities, and relations to others. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1447 (9th ed. 2009).
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"preservation through transformation." 42  The adoption of less socially
controversial rhetoric can enhance the capacity of law to legitimate social
inequalities among different groups.143
The public policy arguments used in the recent embryo disposition
agreement cases, with their focus on protection of choice and individual
freedom,144 provide new rhetorical justifications for policies that maintain a
division between the spheres of the family and the market and reify the
biological essentialism of motherhood.
The maintenance of separate spheres for the family and the market has
been a useful tool to subordinate womenl45 in both spheres. Limiting economic
exchange between intimates systematically disadvantages women by making
domestic labor uncompensable.146 In the meantime, because women generally
make more nonmonetary contributions to the family, they also lose
opportunities in the workplace. 47 This separation of the family and the market,
and its consequences for women, existed in the nineteenth century in the form
of coverture, the legal concept under which the husband and wife were treated
as a single unit and the wife lost the legal capacity to enter into contracts, own
property or earn income, and sue or be sued, among other things.148 The need to
protect the wife, feme covert, from the brutality of commercial and state
relations justified her deprivation of legal personhood.149
As Reva Siegel has persuasively demonstrated, courts faced with earnings
statutes giving women a separate property right in their personal labor refused
to interpret those statutes to allow a wife to contract with her husband for her
labor, recognizing that such an interpretation would be antithetical to the social
142. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule ofLove ": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2119 (1996).
143. Id. at 2120. Siegel provides a compelling account of how domestic violence against women,
once justified by the husband's prerogative of chastisement, see id. at 2122, became shielded from the
law through a judicial doctrine that refused to enter the boundaries of the home, see id. at 2169-70.
144. See supra Part I.B.2.
145. I speak here of women because women historically fell on the domestic side of the divide, and
because the division continues to disproportionately burden women today. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as
Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1214 (1994). But the maintenance of separate spheres has the potential to affect men who
perform the brunt of domestic labor in their intimate relationships, both gay and straight. See Deborah
A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 770-71 (2012) (discussing the
potential replication of traditional gender roles by same-sex couples).
146. Hasday, supra note 27, at 517; see also id. at 518-19 (noting that women contribute more
domestic labor to a marriage, and that nonenforcement of agreements for that labor deprives women of a
source of compensation); Silbaugh, supra note 19, at 133-34 (noting that nonenforcement of
nonmonetary terms in premarital agreements disadvantages women, who, on average, make more
nonmonetary contributions to a marital relationship than men do).
147. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 145, at 762-63 (describing the disproportionate share of
housework performed by women and its relationship to lower earnings).
148. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, at 59; Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything that Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 828.
149. See Minow, supra note 148, at 829.
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order. 50  But because the language of "property-in-persons" was both
antiquated and suspect following the repudiation of slavery, courts had to reach
for new rationales to support the separate-spheres ideology.' 5' Courts therefore
turned to the language of altruism in order to distinguish the family sphere from
the market: "It would be contrary to public policy to permit either [husband or
wife] to make an enforceable contract with the other to perform such services
as are ordinarily imposed upon them by the marital relation, and which should
be the natural prompting of that love and affection which should always exist
between a husband and wife."l 52
This justification of separate spheres, rooted in the protection of the marital
relationship from the debasing influences of the market, lingers on. In Baby M,
for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court brought anti-market rhetoric into
the context of agreements pertaining to reproduction, announcing a public
policy against the enforcement of surrogacy agreements calling for payment to
the surrogate mother in part because "[t]here are, in a civilized society, some
things that money cannot buy."' 53 The court found no inherent evil in a woman
serving as a surrogate mother for another family as long as she was not paid for
her services and could change her mind about surrendering her parental
rights.154 Altruism, in this sense, elided concerns about commodification
otherwise inherent in the arrangement. In Borelli v. Brusseau, 1 a California
court used similar language when it refused to enforce a promise by a husband
who suffered a stroke to convey separate property to his wife in exchange for
her providing "round-the-clock" health care rather than sending him to a
nursing home.156 Noting that spouses are obligated by statute to provide support
to each other,'s7 the court held that the agreement was "antithetical to the
institution of marriage as the Legislature has defined it," stating, "[w]hether or
not the modern marriage has become like a business . . . it continues to be
defined by statute as a personal relationship of mutual support. Thus, even if
few things are left that cannot command a price, marital support remains one of
them."' 58
150. Siegel, supra note 27, at 2147-48, 2181-96.
151. Id. at 2201.
152. Id. at 2204 (quoting Foxworthy v. Adams, 124 S.W. 381, 383 (Ky. 1910)) (emphasis added).
153. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988).
154. Id. at 1235. Although the inability of the surrogate mother to change her mind undoubtedly
affected the court's decision, the court was at least equally concerned about the debasing influence of
money, if not more so. Calling the agreement one for the "sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of
a mother's right to her child," the court expressed the belief that the decision to become a surrogate
depended on the exchange of payment. Id. at 1248. It further worried that potential for payment would
lead poorer women to become surrogates for the affluent-in other words, that money would corrupt a
woman's decision-making process. Id. at 1249-50.
155. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993).
156. Id. at 17-18.
157. Id. at 18.
158. Id. at 20. Reva Siegel argues that the court's "anticontractarian" rationale for nonenforcement
"marks it as a modern expression of coverture doctrine." Siegel, supra note 27, at 2200. Although Siegel
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The Borelli decision exemplifies the anti-market, separate-spheres rhetoric
at its most transparent. And as such, it was easy to criticize, including by the
dissenting justice on the panel. Observing the rapid changes in modem attitudes
toward marriage, Justice Poch6 concluded that the marital relationship could no
longer be regarded as "uniform and unchangeable." 59 Noting that the court's
rule would mean that "if Mrs. Clinton becomes ill, President Clinton must drop
everything and personally care for her," he concluded that "public policy
should not be equated with coerced altruism."160
Indeed, changes in the marital relationship and in the workforce have left
anti-market or altruistic rhetoric sounding a bit passe. In 2007, for example,
seventy percent of mothers with children under the age of eighteen participated
in the workforce, and only one in five families consisted of the traditional male
breadwinner, female homemaker model. With both partners participating in
the workforce, rhetoric that harkens back to a gender-segregated world sounds
obsolete and does not reflect the experiences of most people. Moreover,. the
rigid and immutable duties ascribed to marriage are inconsistent with a divorce
regime that allows spouses to exit the relationship once their individual needs
go unmet.162 In a world of choice, legally imposed domestic support
obligations-what Justice Poch6 called a "nondelegable duty to clean the
bedpans herself'"63-have lost their appeal.
The public policy objection to intimate agreements based on the rhetoric of
personal freedom moves beyond altruism to offer a new rationale for the
separate spheres. Although the embryo disposition cases discussed above relied
on some of the same outmoded justifications for refusing to enforce the
agreements-such as the "hesitancy to become involved in intimate questions
inherent in the marriage relationship" 64 and the "delicate and intimate
character"'6 5 of those questions, as well as policies against enforcement of
surrogacy agreements like the one articulated in Baby M-they downplayed the
anti-market rhetoric. Instead, they drew the line at the home's doorstep in the
name of freedom. In its discussion of public policy, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court repeatedly used the words "forced" or "compelled" to describe
characterizes the public policy doctrine as "anticontractarian" because it sets aside certain transactions
that it will not analyze under "normal contract principles," id. at 2200 n.259, the public policy doctrine
does not exist outside of contract law but is a central part of it. At its core is the power of the courts to
declare a particular agreement against the public good. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
159. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Poch&, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
160. Id. at 24, 25.
161. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 145, at 757-58 & n.161.
162. Scott & Scott, supra note 96, at 1242 (noting the effect of the no-fault divorce regime on the
incentives of spouses to defect from the marital relationship, and the systematic harms to women).
163. Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
164. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000).
165. Id. at 1059 (quoting Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 130 (1974)); see also In re Marriage of
Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003) (expressing "a general reluctance to become involved in
intimate questions inherent in personal relationships").
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the contract at issue and invoked "freedom of personal choice," ''respect for
liberty and privacy," and the "freedom to decide whether to enter into a family
relationship" in justifying its decision. 1 But while the justifications differ,16 7
the result remains the same-when an agreement involves matters thought to
pertain to the home, courts will not step in.
There is reason to believe that the rhetoric of personal freedom embraced
in the embryo disposition cases has already begun to extend to other types of
intimate agreements. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
declined to enforce an agreement by a woman in a same-sex relationship, B.L.,
to co-parent a child that was conceived by her partner, T.F. The two women
discussed their preferences regarding the child's gender, baptism, schooling,
and the division of labor between the couple should they have a child.169
Having decided to pursue parenthood through artificial insemination, the
partners signed the fertility clinic's consent form, worked together to select an
anonymous sperm donor, and paid for the procedure with their joint funds.170
After T.F. became pregnant, the parties' relationship began to deteriorate,
and B.L. moved out of their shared apartment two months before the child's
birth. '7 Even then, B.L. expressed a desire to be the child's parent, saying that
she wanted to adopt the child, and promising financial support.172 Following
the child's birth, B.L. visited T.F. in the hospital and helped select the baby's
name. 73 She also sent photographs of herself with the child to her friends,
accompanied by the message, "'I hope you all enjoy the pics of my wonderful,
beautiful boy."' 74 But within three months, B.L. notified T.F. that she desired
no further contact with the child.175
The court concluded that B.L. agreed to share parenting responsibilities,
but held that the agreement violated public policy and would not be
enforced.176 It invoked the policy against forced procreation that it recognized
in A.Z., 7 7 reasoning that "in order to protect the 'freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life, . . . prior agreements to enter into familial
166. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058-59.
167. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court cited its decision in Miller v. Miller, 42 N.W. 641
(Iowa 1889), in support of its policy against resolving "intimate questions inherent in personal
relationships." Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781. It did not, however, quote the part of the Miller decision
embracing the rhetoric of altruism: "The marital obligation of husband and wife in the interest of homes,
both happy and useful, have a higher and stronger inducement than mere money consideration, and they
are generally of a character that the judgments or processes of the courts cannot materially aid .... "
Miller, 42 N.W. at 642 (emphasis added).
168. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. 2004).




173. Id. at 1248.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1250-51.
177. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
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relationships (marriage or parenthood) should not be enforced against
individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions." 78
The result in this case is surprising not only because the facts suggested
that the decision by both partners to have the child involved the discussion of
specific parental roles and duties, formalities like meeting with physicians and
executing a consent form, and multiple opportunities to change course, but also
because it left the child with only one responsible parent, a situation that the
law customarily seeks to avoid.' 7 9 So important was the policy protecting
B.L.'s freedom to change her mind that the court relieved her of support
obligations for a child whose birth she helped to bring about. The court's
invocation of this zone of freedom therefore had the same effect as the older
rhetoric of altruism: it created a world-centered around familial
relationships-in which the court would not interfere. It also policed the
boundaries of the traditional family by thwarting the expansion of parenthood
outside its traditional context.
B. Naturalizing Motherhood
The rhetoric of individual freedom has also revitalized public policies
emphasizing the importance of motherhood to women and the superiority of
biological parenthood to other forms of parenthood. By relegating women to
their appropriate place in the home, these policies reinforce the separation of
market and the family, with all the consequences that follow. The
nonenforcement of agreements for the use of assisted reproductive technologies
has also provided courts the opportunity to articulate norms regarding the value
of biological parenthood. These norms in turn bolster the importance of
biological parenthood in other contexts, such as the debate over whether to
extend the right of same-sex marriage to gay couples and the discussion of
women's abortion rights.
The maternal bond has long anchored decisions that invalidate intimate
agreements on public policy grounds. For instance, courts have suggested that
the specialness of the mother-child relationship interferes with the contracting
process by rendering women incapable of making rational or informed
commitments regarding reproduction. In Baby M, 10 for example, the court
voided a surrogacy agreement in part because "the natural mother [was]
irrevocably committed" to surrender the infant she carried "before she [knew]
178. T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1251 (quoting A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059).
179. See id. at 1253 (recognizing that the husband of a woman who undergoes artificial
insemination is obligated to pay child support); see also id. at 1255-56 (Greaney, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the best interests of the child should have been considered, and would weigh in favor of imposing a
duty of support).
180. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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the strength of her bond with her child."' 81 And it worried about "the impact on
the natural mother as the full weight of her isolation is felt along with the full
reality of the sale of her body and her child."' 8 2
In recent years, the notion of the maternal bond has continued to justify
public-policy-based invalidations of surrogacy agreements, 1 but has come
under increasing criticism for its tendency to perpetuate negative gender
stereotypes. 184 After all, to treat biological motherhood as the paramount role
of a woman "exalts a woman's experience of pregnancy and childbirth over her
formation of emotional, intellectual, and interpersonal decisions and
expectations.'s It is also out of step with changing views about the role of
reproduction and childrearing in women's lives.186
And, compellingly for some scholars, this public policy has anchored
women-protective rationales for limiting abortion rights. In Bradwell v.
State, Justice Bradley famously stated that "[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother." 89 Although Justice Ginsburg recently characterized these sentiments
as "ancient notions about women's place in the family . . . that have long since
been discredited,"' 90 the fact that she had to invoke them in an opinion
dissenting from the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the federal Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 in Gonzales v. Carhart'91 indicates that they
are not as discredited as she suggests. In fact, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion echoed Justice Bradley's sentiments, stating that "[r]espect for human
181. Id. at 1248.
182. Id. at 1250.
183. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998); A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-
09-1838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009) (extending the Baby M decision to the gestational surrogacy
context).
184. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109, 142 (2009) (discussing the retreat of feminist and women's groups from the movement
against surrogacy); Shultz, supra note 92, at 384-85 (criticizing the use of gender stereotypes to reify the
essential role of motherhood and to relegate women to the domestic sphere).
185. Shultz, supra note 92, at 384.
186. Serial dating among middle-class people in their twenties and thirties is prevalent, see ERIC
KLINENBERG, GOING SOLO: THE EXTRAORDINARY RISE AND SURPRISING APPEAL OF LIVING ALONE 14
(2012), and one in five women end their childbearing years without giving birth, double the rate from
the 1970s, id. at 67.
187. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255,
291-92 (2011) (arguing that both Baby M and the Supreme Court's most recent abortion decision used a
woman's regret to indicate disapproval of interventions with traditional reproduction); Scott, supra note
184, at 142-45 (observing the use of women-protective arguments to curtail reproductive autonomy);
Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective
Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1688-89 (2008) (contending that the woman-protective
antiabortion arguments "restrict[] women's choices to free them to perform their natural role as
mothers"); Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1242-43 (2010).
188. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
189. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
190. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
191. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her
child."' 92 These views about motherhood and the mother-child relationship
justified the tightening of restrictions on the use of certain types of abortion
procedures. To Reva Siegel, the underlying logic of the decision, based on
the imagined needs of the woman who wants to bear a child but cannot provide
for her existing family, "is that by restricting all women, government can free
women to be the mothers they naturally are."' 94 The women-protective anti-
abortion argument "restricts women's choices to free them to perform their
natural role as mothers." 95
The rhetoric of individual freedom masks the rhetoric of the maternal bond.
The emphasis on individual freedom presents the specialness of the mother-
child bond in gender-neutral terms. In J.B.,196 for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court relied heavily on its Baby M decision to articulate its policy
against enforcement of embryo disposition agreements.197 But instead of
adopting the gender-based reasoning of its prior decision, it reinterpreted its
protection of a surrogate mother's right to change her mind to protect the
ability of either spouse to "reconsider[] his or her earlier acquiescence ... to
become a biological parent." 98
The public policy protecting individual freedom in matters pertaining to the
family sounds gender-neutral and seems to avoid the trappings of stereotypical
assumptions about motherhood. But assumptions regarding biological
parentage lurk beneath the surface. In noting that it would not enforce
agreements resulting in unwanted genetic parentage in most instances, the J.B.
court reserved to itself the power to award the embryos to one of the parties if
the party seeking to use the embryos "ha[d] become infertile."1 99 Two justices,
concurring, emphasized that in that instance, the balance would shift in favor of
the infertile party, and that adoption would not suffice as an alternative means
of attaining parenthood.200 Although couples may turn to IVF due to the
infertility of either the woman or the man, the woman is much more likely to
192. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
193. See id. at 159-60. This portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion has been amply criticized for its
invocation of the maternal bond and the regret that Justice Kennedy assumes will follow an ill-informed
decision by a woman to terminate her pregnancy. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 187, at 261-63
(collecting various criticisms); Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed
Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1559, 1619 (2008) (criticizing the misapplication of
informed consent principles); Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Woman Scorned?: Resurrecting Infertile Women s
Decision-Making Autonomy, 71 MD. L. REV. 339, 359-60 (2012) (identifying criticisms of the
pathologizing of the abortion decision based on stereotypes of the maternal bond); Reva B. Siegel,
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694,
1699 (2008) (characterizing Justice Kennedy's reasoning as "gender-paternalist").
194. Siegel, supra note 187, at 1688.
195. Id.
196. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
197. Id. at 718.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
200. See id. (Vemiero, J., concurring); id. (Zazzali, J., concurring).
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become more infertile as she ages.201 The policy of protecting the interests of
the infertile party to bear children would therefore seem to rest on the
importance of biological motherhood.
Also recall that, notwithstanding the courts' gender-neutral language
regarding reproductive decisionmaking, the states have a poor track record
treating men's and women's choices as equally significant. For instance,
although Massachusetts's statutory four-day waiting period before a parent can
surrender a newborn for adoption covers some classes of fathers as well as
mothers,202 the A.Z. court characterized that statutory requirement to provide
that "no mother may agree to surrender her child . . . regardless of any prior
agreement." 203 The mother-centric reading of the waiting period coincides with
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's previous statement that the waiting
period "should be interpreted as providing that no mother may effectively agree
to surrender her child for adoption earlier than the fourth day after its birth, by
which time she better knows the strength of her bond with her child."204 New
Jersey invalidates "[a] surrender by the birth parent of a child . . . taken within
72 hours of the birth of the child," but allows an alleged father to deny paternity
and waive his right to consent to the child's surrender "at any time including
prior to the birth of the child."205 In these states, the decision-making freedom
of which the courts speak originates from specific assumptions about the
maternal role.
Before the advances in reproductive technologies that form the backdrop of
this Article, the mother-child relationship was defined by biology: bearing and
206birthing a baby established the legal status of motherhood. Determination of
paternity was always more complex, allowing a man to establish paternity by
acknowledgment, or by presuming paternity based on "the man's relationship
to a child's mother."207 But under this arrangement, a man could be a legal
parent of a child regardless of whether he was the child's biological father.
When it became possible through genetic testing to establish a man's biological
paternity, courts had to decide whether biological paternity could override the
presumptions that had traditionally decided the matter.208 In Michael H. v.
Gerald D., the Supreme Court answered that question in favor of status,
201. See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1063, 1066 (1996) (arguing that women should be entitled to possession of cryopreserved embryos
because their fertility declines over time).
202. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2 (2008) (requiring written consent of the child's "lawful
parents"). The courts do not appear to have spoken with any clarity on the right of unmarried biological
fathers to refuse to consent to the adoption of their children.
203. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000) (emphasis added).
204. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998) (emphasis added).
205. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(e) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
206. See Shultz, supra note 92, at 316.
207. See id. at 317.
208. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see also Shultz, supra note 92, at 318
(discussing Michael H.).
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upholding a California statute establishing an irrebuttable presumption that a
child born during a marriage was the husband's child.209
With advances in reproductive technologies, women too can establish
different claims to motherhood as a genetic parent, gestational parent, or legal
parent.210 For example, a gestational surrogate is a gestational mother of the
child, but not the child's genetic mother; either may be the child's legal mother,
depending on the state in which the birth occurs.211
How strange, then, that in the face of these different claims to motherhood,
courts have generally privileged biology over status-as in the Baby M case-
and the genetic mother over the nongenetic. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, for example, has recognized a public policy against the
enforcement of a traditional, paid surrogacy agreement based on concerns
about commodification similar to those voiced in Baby M.212 But it has also
indicated that a gestational surrogacy agreement would not raise the same
concerns because the children "have no genetic relation to the gestational
carrier." The lack of a genetic tie between the gestational carrier and the
children she bore led that court to apply a marital presumption in favor of a
husband and wife-the providers of the genetic material-even though the
surrogate, not the wife, gave birth to the child.214 It also led the court to ignore
its concern in the traditional surrogacy context that "economic pressure will
cause a woman to . . . permit her body to be used and her child to be given
away."215 Even assuming that the absence of a genetic connection means that a
gestational carrier would not be giving away "her" child,216 a court truly
concerned with the commodification of women's bodies would not allow its
concerns to so easily fall away. The disparate treatment of maternity and
paternity suggests that policies protecting the genetic tie uniquely naturalize the
importance of genetic motherhood to women.217
209. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129-30.
210. See Cohen, supra note 122, at 1121-22 (disaggregating the types of parenthood and the
parallel rights not to procreate).
211. Compare Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1983) (holding that the intended mother
of the child, in this case the genetic mother, would be the child's legal mother), with A.G.R. v. D.R.H. &
S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009) (holding that the gestational mother was the
legal mother of the children).
212. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass. 1998) (noting the potentially coercive aspects of
offering payment for surrogacy and the need to protect a mother's ability to reconsider the decision to
surrender a child for a limited period after its birth).
213. Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconness Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d I133, 1138 (Mass. 2001).
214. Id.at 1137.
215. Id. (alterations and emphasis omitted) (quoting R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 796).
216. Many would dispute this assumption. See, e.g., Barbara Katz Rothman, Daddy Plants a Seed:
Personhood Under Patriarchy, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 1241, 1246-47 (1996) (criticizing as patriarchal the
notion that gametes, as opposed to gestation, constitute motherhood).
217. Of course, an alternate explanation for this particular result could be a desire on the part of the
court to place the resulting child within a marital relationship. Melissa Murray has previously observed
the strong tendency of courts to award custody based on the existence of a marital or quasi-marital
relationship of the interested adults. See Melissa Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy,
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Courts also equate biological parenthood with personal fulfillment. In
Reber v. Reiss,218 divorcing spouses failed to execute a valid embryo
disposition agreement.219 The husband subsequently began a relationship with
another woman and had a biological son with her; meanwhile, the wife, age
forty-four, had no children and therefore sought use of the embryos to become
a mother.220 Although the husband contended that adoption or foster parenting
were available to the wife, the court distinguished between an interest in
procreating and merely becoming a parent.221 Crediting her testimony that she
"always wanted to have children . . . and . . . wanted that experience of being
pregnant and that closeness, that bond,"222 the court agreed that "the ability to
have a biological child and/or be pregnant is a distinct experience from
adoption."223 It reasoned that although "[a]doption is a laudable, wonderful,
and fulfilling experience for those wishing to experience parenthood, . . . it
occupies a different place for a woman." 224 Because adoption could not "be
given equal weight" to having a genetically related child, the court awarded the
wife the frozen embryos.225 This decision rejects the notion that adoption and
biological motherhood are equivalent, and emphasizes the superiority of
biological motherhood over other options.226
In addition to essentializing the role of motherhood for women, public
policies protecting the genetic tie between mothers and children provide courts
with the opportunity to articulate notions of the public good that apply to other
areas of state regulation. The policing of groups on the periphery of society
articulates social norms intended to govern the majority.227 Efforts by those
20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 387, 399-400 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
unmarried father cases can be understood as expressing a preference for the marital family over other
alternatives). This alternate explanation would support my larger thesis that these public policy
decisions police the boundaries of the traditional family.
218. 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
219. Id. at 1136 (noting that neither spouse signed the part of the consent form related to the
disposition of cryopreserved embryos).
220. Id. at 1133.
221. Id.at 1138.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. Id. The court went on to note that adoption would not be a practical option for the wife in any
event because of her age and marital status. See id. at 1139.
226. This essentialist reasoning arguably benefited the infertile woman in this case by giving her
what she wanted: possession of the embryos. But in many cases, the same reasoning disadvantages one
woman against another, as in the gestational surrogacy context. On the whole, therefore, policies
perpetuating the essentialized view of motherhood harm women broadly by justifying status inequalities,
and can also directly deny women the results they seek in a given case.
227. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship and
the Legal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIz. L. REV. 43, 54-60 (2012) (arguing that the
same-sex marriage movement has provided courts the opportunity to express views about "proper"
marital relationships that they would not have had the occasion to state otherwise); Ariela R. Dubler, In
the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112
YALE L.J. 1641, 1646 (2003) (observing that the legal regulation of unmarried women has played a
constitutive role in the regulation of marriage).
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outside the nuclear family to achieve genetic parenthood through contract have
provided the courts with opportunities to articulate public policies emphasizing
the specialness of the genetic relationship between parent and child.
These judicial pronouncements promoting the prestige of biological
parentage coincide with other attempts to regulate family structures. For
example, messages about the importance of genetic parenthood parallel
arguments deployed by supporters of traditional marriage against advocates of
same-sex marriage. In their merits brief before the Ninth Circuit, the
proponents of Proposition 8-the California constitutional amendment limiting
marriage to a man and a woman 228-argued that a central "purpose of marriage,
always and everywhere, has been to further society's interest in increasing the
likelihood that children will be born to and raised by the couples who brought
them into the world in stable and enduring family units." 229 Differential
treatment of gay and lesbian couples rests on the claim that they cannot "unite
the biological, social and legal components of parenthood into one lasting
bond." 230 However, because many different configurations of people can
provide emotional support to one another, engage in a panoply of sex acts, and
even raise children, the definition of traditional marriage must turn on "a
special link to children" 23 1 resulting only from the heterosexual sex act:
"[I]ndividual adults are naturally incomplete with respect to one biological
function: sexual reproduction. In coitus, but not in other forms of sexual
contact, a man and a woman's bodies coordinate by way of their sexual organs
for the common biological purpose of reproduction." 232 To traditional marriage
advocates, biology alone provides the special link.
228. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (as of Mar. 29, 2013).
229. Brief of Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants at 77, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.
2012) (No. 10-16696), 2010 WL 4622581, at *52-53; see also id. at *80 (arguing that the presence of
two biological parents, rather than any two parents, is most likely to generate positive outcomes for
children).
230. David Blankenhorn, Op-Ed., How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed.html; see
also Brief of Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of
Representatives at 51, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(Nos. 12-15388, 12-15409), 2012 WL 2132484, at *51 ("Because same-sex relationships are incapable
of creating families of mother, father, and biological children, the legitimate state interest in promoting a
family structure that facilitates the rearing of children by both biological parents is distinctively served
by the traditional definition.").
231. Sherif Girgis, Robert P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What Is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 245, 252 (2010) (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 254. Several earlier marriage equality cases adopted a variant of this argument in
rejecting marriage between same-sex individuals. Because only heterosexuals can procreate, and
because "accident[al] or impuls[ive]" heterosexual sexual activity can lead to unintentional parenthood,
legislatures, it was thought, could rationally "offer the benefits of marriage to opposite-sex couples
only" in order to induce the formation of stable relationships. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7
(N.Y. 2006); see also Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006) (citing Morrison v.
Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("the 'institution' of opposite-sex marriage both
encourages such couples to enter into a stable relationship before having children and to remain in such
a relationship if children arrive during the marriage unexpectedly.")).
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The policies emphasizing the importance of biological motherhood and the
genetic tie and the argument for excluding from marriage those relationships
that cannot result in the birth of genetically related children are mutually
reinforcing. They illustrate the role of the public policy doctrine in policing
intimate conduct, both by providing new justifications for old status privileges
and by articulating social norms that burden marginal groups. It is those
burdens that I turn to in the next Part.
III. THE COSTS OF PUBLIC POLICING
By now it should be clear that courts use the public policy doctrine in an
attempt to shape social norms even in situations where the law, in the form of
statutes or policies, is formally agnostic.233 As discussed above, by keeping
certain reproductive decisions outside of the realm of legal enforcement, the
doctrine has reinforced the border between the market and the family and the
controlling image of motherhood despite (or through) the rhetorical shift
towards individual freedom. Clothed in the language of truths universally
acknowledged, these policies attempt to "persuade people that the world
described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a
sane person would want to live." 234 This Part first considers the relationship
between the policies articulated in the context of agreements for the use of
assisted reproductive technologies and the policies articulated in the context of
other intimate agreements. It demonstrates how these policies work together to
shore up gender stereotypes that perpetuate inequalities between men and
women. It then examines the special toll the policies take on nontraditional
intimate arrangements and connects those costs to broader forms of social
regulation.
A. Contract Doctrine and the Production of Gender
The production and maintenance of traditional gender relationships through
application of the public policy doctrine discussed in the previous Part extend
to a wide variety of intimate agreements. Marriage is a gender factory-
fostering differentiated gender-role development and legitimating those
roles 235 -and the public policy doctrine has had an important supporting role in
233. See Widiss, supra note 145, at 764-67 (noting that family law and employment law are
formally sex-neutral, but that gender norms continue to encourage role specialization in marriage).
234. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 109 (1984).
235. Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 3-4, 22-29 (2010)
(proposing that many view marriage as a "purposefully gendered institution" and offering social science
data in support of that view). The recent statements made during oral arguments before the Supreme
Court in the Proposition 8 case bears this out. Counsel for the Proponents of Proposition 8, Charles
Cooper, justified California's restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples by twice noting that
treating marriage as a "genderless institution" would threaten other marital norms like fidelity,
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policing its borders. Here, I discuss the courts' treatment of several types of
agreements to illustrate this.
At first blush, the widespread trend of enforcing prenuptial agreements
appears to suggest that courts have become less interested in using the public
policy doctrine to protect the boundaries of the marital relationship. Although
the legal requisites vary somewhat, every state allows future spouses to enter
into legally enforceable agreements regarding property distribution, 236 and most
states enforce postmarital agreements between separated or divorcing
spouses.237 Indeed, courts have sometimes celebrated these decisions as a
triumph of modem notions of gender equality over traditional assumptions
regarding a woman's incapacity to look out for her own rights. In Simeone v.
Simeone,238 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that "the
stereotype that women serve as homemakers while men work as breadwinners
is no longer viable," "often today both spouses are income eamers," and
"women nowadays quite often have substantial education, financial awareness,
income, and assets." 239 It relied on these societal changes to ground its
treatment of prenuptial agreements like any other contract, 24 even though the
husband in the case, a thirty-nine-year-old surgeon at the time of marriage,
presented his wife-to-be, a twenty-three-year-old nurse, with the agreement on
the eve of their wedding and she signed it without the advice of counsel.24'
This progress narrative, however, obscures continued refusals by the courts
242to alter firmly entrenched norms. First, for all their claimed solicitude
towards prenuptial agreements, courts avoid enforcing agreements that affect
spousal duties. In Graham v. Graham,243 a court refused to enforce an alleged
monogamy, and procreation. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, 25, Hollingsworth v. Perry (No. 12-
144) (argued Mar. 26, 2013).
236. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, at 210; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law
Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Deflault Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J.
1881, 1917 & n.142 (2012) (collecting statutes and cases).
237. See, e.g., Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 958 n.1, 961 (Mass. 2010) (recognizing a
trend in most states of recognizing the validity of agreements between married spouses pertaining to the
legal rights and obligations that would otherwise arise under the laws governing marital dissolution).
238. 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
239. Id. at 165.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 163. The agreement limited the husband to a maximum payment of $200 per week in the
event of their separation and a total payment of $25,000. Id. at 164. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Papadakos accused the majority opinion of expressing the belief that the passage of a state equal rights
amendment eliminated "all vestiges of inequality between the sexes" and identified areas of lingering
inequality. Id. at 168 (Papadakos, J., concurring). I do not mean to suggest that the differences in their
ages and occupations necessarily affected the ability of the parties to reach a fair agreement in this
particular case, but merely note the potential for those differences to affect the fairness or voluntariness
of the bargain.
242. By "progress narrative," I mean a story of legal change in which institutions are modernized
and liberal values vindicated. See Laura F. Edwards, The History in "Critical Legal Histories, " 37 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 187, 191-92 (2012) (commenting on Gordon, supra note 234). I thank Melissa Murray
for helping me to frame this point.
243. 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940).
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written agreement requiring Margrethe Graham to pay her husband Sidney
$300 per month during their marriage. 244 In his complaint, Sidney alleged that
Margrethe agreed to pay him the monthly stipend to induce him to quit his job
at a hotel and accompany her on her travels. 245 Setting aside the parties' factual
dispute-Margrethe called Sidney's "abandonment of work and continued
reliance upon her for support" "distasteful"24 6-the court held that the alleged
agreement could not be enforced on public policy grounds.247 Noting that
marriage "creates a status . . . under which certain rights and duties incident to
the relationship come into being, irrespective of the wishes of the parties," the
court observed that marriage required "the husband to support ... his wife and
the wife . . . to . .. follow him in his choice of domicile." 248 That the agreement
subjected Sidney to his wife's travel whims and contemplated her providing the
249
couple's financial support rendered it contrary to the public good.
Although Graham is an old decision, more recent cases demonstrate that
courts continue to resist enforcing contracts that adjust traditional spousal
duties. In Borelli v. Brusseau,250 discussed in Section II.A above, a California
court refused to enforce a promise by a husband who suffered a stroke to
convey separate property to his wife in exchange for her providing "round-the-
clock" health care, noting that the care fell within the wife's spousal support
obligations that she was required to "personally" discharge. 25 In Boudreaux v.
Boudreaux,252 a husband agreed to pay his wife $1500 per month in alimony "if
he filed for divorce for any reason, including adultery" in order to prevent his
wife from divorcing him.253 When he filed for divorce four years later, the
husband sought to invalidate the agreement.254 The court agreed that the
agreement violated public policy, noting that the "agreement to pay alimony,
regardless of fault-even adultery . . . would undermine the sanctity of
marriage, and would encourage the parties to approve adulterous conduct for a
255price" in contravention of the duty of "fidelity" owed by spouses. And in
Favrot v. Barnes,256 a court refused to enforce an agreement between a husband
244. Id. at 936.
245. Id. at 936-37.
246. Id. at 937 (emphasis added). Margrethe's choice of words here appears intentionally designed
to invoke an emotional response to both the content and manner of her husband's assertions.
247. Id. at 938.
248. Id. at 938 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 939.
250. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993).
251. Id. at 17-20 (citing cases indicating that "support in a marriage means more than the physical
care someone could be hired to provide").
252. 745 So. 2d 61 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
253. Id. at 62.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 63. But see Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 495-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(invalidating a contractual provision penalizing infidelity between spouses on the ground that it
conflicted with the state's policy protecting the right to divorce regardless of fault).
256. 332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976).
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and wife limiting sexual intercourse to about once a week.257 The husband
sought to prove that his wife was at fault for the divorce by seeking coitus
"thrice daily," but the court held that such an agreement-attempting to modify
the spousal obligation to "fulfill 'the reasonable and normal sex desires of each
other,"'-would not be enforceable. 258
Although courts routinely enforce agreements for the disposition of
property,259 they treat sexual obligations and nonfinancial support as
nonnegotiable. By striking down agreements altering the husband's support
obligations, the wife's domestic care obligations, and monogamous and healthy
sexuality, these cases offer anecdotal evidence suggesting that agreements
transgressing traditional gender roles fare particularly poorly in the courts.
Admittedly, not enough data exist to draw a firm conclusion. But, at the very
least, the differential treatment of spousal agreements for property and other
marital duties appears to reinforce the separation between the market and the
home, recognizing agreements that benefit the spouse with economic power-
usually the husband 260-while disadvantaging the spouse providing the
caregiving services.
Courts further protect traditional gender norms by refusing to enforce
agreements in ongoing marriages, preserving the status quo until the time when
261the relationship is already at an end. Indeed, a great majority of cases
involving contracts between spouses come to the court's attention either during
divorce proceedings or after the death of a spouse. And courts prefer it that
way. In In re Estate of Hollett,262 for example, a surviving wife attempted to
invalidate a prenuptial agreement negotiated on the eve of her wedding under
circumstances suggesting duress.263 In upholding the agreement, the trial court
observed that at no time during the parties' ten years of marriage did the wife
attempt to rescind the agreement.264 But the appellate court held that public
policy prohibited consideration of that evidence: "The law frowns upon
litigation between husband and wife. Where their relations are friendly and
affectionate, it takes account of the fact that she would be loath to institute legal
proceedings against him."265 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would
"penalize [the wife] for choosing not to disrupt her marriage, which the trial
257. Id. at 875.
258. Id.
259. See Silbaugh, supra note 19, at 70-71.
260. Id. at 98 (pointing out that men "bring more wages to a marriage and women bring more
unpaid labor").
261. See Case, supra note 135, at 225 (citing Saul Levmore's observation that married couples
must normally resort to self-help to resolve disputes short of taking the extreme step of dissolution).
262. 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003).
263. Id. at 349-50 (describing the husband and wife's age and income differences, the fact that she
was asked to negotiate the agreement with a recent law school graduate as her counsel on the eve of the
wedding, and the fact that she was disconsolate throughout most of the negotiating process).
264. Id. at 353.
265. Id. (quoting In re Flannery's Estate, 173 A. 303, 304 (Pa. 1934)).
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court characterized as 'close,' 'loving' and 'traditional,' with a lawsuit against
her husband." 266 One cannot be certain what facts led the court to consider their
relationship traditional, although the fact that the husband was thirty years
older, was far more financially successful and sophisticated, and encouraged
his wife to quit her "low level jobs" to stay at home likely contributed to its
conclusion.267 The awareness that the relationship reflected traditional gender
roles clearly contributed to the court's desire to protect it from disturbance.
The combined effect of creating a realm impervious to contract and
imposing standard marital duties is the reinforcement of whatever gender
norms those standard duties express. As with public policy decisions in the
context of reproductive agreements, the selective public-policy-based
disapproval of marital agreements often endorses traditional gender
relationships.
Much has been said about the role of traditional gender stereotypes in
maintaining inequality between men and women, so I only briefly discuss the
implications of contract law's public policing here. The public policy doctrine
joins the various other legal structures that promote gender role differentiation
along traditional lines.268 Katherine Baker has recently observed the extent to
which married people internalize these roles notwithstanding income level or
education: for example, despite a widespread belief that both parents should be
equally involved in caregiving, "belief in gender egalitarianism" is in fact
correlated with "gendered work patterns."269 The stickiness of these roles has
preserved the division of domestic labor along traditional gender lines
notwithstanding the gradual elimination of most formal sex-based
classifications.270 Efforts to eliminate structural inequalities based on equal
access to opportunities both in and out of the home may therefore depend on
the loosening of these norms.271
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. Id. at 349, 352-53.
268. Deborah Widiss has identified examples of legal regimes that, while formally sex-neutral,
continue to encourage role specialization among married couples, including social security, the federal
"marriage penalty" for couples earning relatively comparable amounts, and public benefits work
requirements. See Widiss, supra note 145, at 748-51. Widiss notes that despite the formal neutrality of
these regimes, opposite-sex-couple specialization breaks down along traditionally gendered lines. Id. at
757-65.
269. See Baker, supra note 235, at 25. She notes that "[elducation level is highly correlated with
belief in gender equality, as is income level. Yet, the more wealth a married couple has, the more
profound their gender specialization tends to be." Id. at 25-26.
270. See Widiss, supra note 145, at 763, 765 (noting that even women who earn higher incomes
outside the home perform more domestic work than their husbands, and that studies suggest that many
people prefer adherence to traditional roles); see also Siegel, supra note 145, at 1214 ("Today, as in the
nineteenth century, it is women who perform the work of the family, women who seek to escape the
work, and women who eke out a living performing the work-for other women.").
271. See Widiss, supra note 145, at 793 (noting the existence of two approaches to "address[ing]
the imbalance in caretaking functions provided by men and women," one focused on countering gender
norms, and the other focused on accommodating them); see also Dubler, supra note 34 (criticizing the
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However, the public policy doctrine shores up these norms by articulating
them as public goods even as it denies legal recognition to attempts to alter
them. Discussions of the doctrine even enter the public's mind from time to
time outside the context of a particular lawsuit. When Facebook founder Mark
Zuckerberg married Priscilla Chan in May 2012, several news outlets reported
on an agreement that he and Chan made several years earlier when she decided
to move to California to be with him:
The couple agreed that they would not live together, but that Mr.
Zuckerberg would spend at least 100 minutes of private time with Ms.
Chan a week, as well as take her on at least one date . . .. The couple
also agreed to vacation for two weeks yearly overseas ... .272
Around this time, the New York Times ran a story on "relationship
agreements"-agreements between couples "delineating the idiosyncratic needs
of their relationship"-reporting that "most lawyers think that such agreements
generally are legally unenforceable." 273 Although the article touted the potential
benefits of such agreements, the examples used to illustrate what the
agreements could entail appeared to trivialize them and created the impression
that attempts at customization would be unenforceable at any rate.274 This
encapsulation of popular attitudes toward intimate contracting suggests that the
public policy doctrine's role in keeping contract logic outside of the intimate
realm.
B. Marginalizing Sexual Minorities
The previous section demonstrated the role of the public policy doctrine in
perpetuating what many consider to be problematic social inequalities. In this
section, my focus narrows to those who fall outside of the traditional marital
relationship. By placing decisions regarding assisted reproductive technologies
outside the reach of contract law, courts impose obstacles to the use of those
technologies by a range of sexual minorities, including gay men and
lesbians.275 Women seeking to bring a genetically related child into a same-sex
role of gender norms in imposing caregiving responsibilities on women, and calling for "our leaders ...
to abandon their antiquated assumptions about men's and women's roles at work and at home").
272. Laura M. Holson & Nick Bilton, Facebook's Royal Wedding, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/fashion/who-is-priscilla-chan.html.
273. Jan Hoffman, Just Call It a Pre-Prenup, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/fashion/the-background-on-relationship-agreements.html.
274. See id. (discussing agreements to feed the fish or to allow a partner to take one cruise-ship
vacation per year alone).
275. The arguments I make in this section would apply with equal force to those with non-typical
sexual orientations or gender identities, like transgender, intersex, and genderqueer individuals. See
generally Michael Shulman, Generation LGBTQIA, NY TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/fashion/generation-lgbtqia.htm (providing an overview of the
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relationship must, at a minimum, use sperm from a donor, whether anonymous
or otherwise.276 Gay men seeking to have a genetically related child depend on
the involvement of an egg donor and a gestational surrogate.277 The gamete
donation, IVF, and surrogacy processes all involve legal risks and therefore
typically trigger contracting behavior.278
Policies against enforcing agreements involving reproductive technologies
can make those technologies less readily available,279 thereby encouraging
traditional reproduction or adoption. Although not every court to address
agreements regarding reproductive technologies has invalidated them on public
policy grounds,280 those that do adhere to a model in which the conception of
children occurs between one man and one woman. Compare the case of T.F. v.
B.L.,281 in which the court refused to enforce an agreement by a lesbian
cohabitant to co-parent a child,282 with Kesler v. Weniger,283 a case in which the
court refused to enforce an agreement by a woman not to seek child support
from her longtime heterosexual paramour.284 In the former, the court declined
to hold the defendant to her agreement notwithstanding the fact that she
discussed various aspects of the parenting relationship with the plaintiff,
accompanied her to doctor appointments, signed consent forms at the medical
clinic, selected the child's sperm donor, selected the child's name, and initially
provided financial support.285 In the latter, a woman in a long-term extramarital
affair, whose husband had since died, allegedly promised her lover that he
would not be held responsible for the financial support of their child if he
broad spectrum of gender and sexual identities as expressed by current college students). My arguments
would also apply to individuals who, for whatever reason, are culturally or biologically infertile. And, of
course, the arguments would apply to those who do not consider themselves sexual minorities but
nevertheless must rely on assisted reproductive technologies to attain genetic parenthood.
276. Sarah Abramowicz, The Legal Regulation of Gay and Lesbian Families as Interstate
Immigration Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 11, 18 (2012) (responding to Kerry Abrams, The Hidden
Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353 (2009)); John A.
Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
323, 349 (2004).
277. Abramowicz, supra note 276, at 18; Robertson, supra note 276, at 350-51.
278. See Brian Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1768-69 (2007).
279. In addition to any deterrent effects that may result from legal uncertainty, see infra note 301,
public policies may literally have the effect of preventing reproduction, see, e.g., In re Marriage of
Witten, 672 N.W. 2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003) (preventing the use of a couple's cryopreserved embryos
without the consent of both ex-spouses).
280. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (enforcing an embryo disposition
agreement); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (same); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48
P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (same).
281. 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004).
282. See id. at 1252.
283. 744 A.2d 794 (Pa. Super. 2000).
284. See id. at 796.
285. See T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1247-48.
[Vol. 25:1196
Public Policing of Intimate Agreements
helped her to conceive.286 The court refused to enforce this agreement, citing a
public policy against bargaining away a child's right to support.287
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that an intended lesbian co-parent
cannot be bound to support a child whose birth she induces, while a
heterosexual man cannot avoid legal parentage of a child he was promised he
would not have to support.288 The public policies plainly function to reinforce
the value of a child having one mother and one father, and discount the value of
two same-sex parents.
Decisions adopting public policies against the enforcement of surrogacy
agreements-either traditional or gestational-also reveal a preference for
family arrangements involving two (and only two) heterosexual parents. 289
Surrogacy agreements usually involve reproduction by more than two
participants. In the Baby M case, for example, a married husband and wife
sought the assistance of another woman to provide an egg and to carry the
pregnancy to term.290 The purpose of such an agreement was to allow the
husband and wife to become parents of the child and to terminate the surrogate
mother's parental status: this termination and substitution is what the court
found most problematic and what public policy would not allow. 291By
invalidating the agreement on public policy grounds, the court "restore[d] the
'surrogate' as the mother of the child," 292 thus ensuring that the child had only
one father and one mother. In a recent decision, a New Jersey court extended
this result to gestational surrogacy.293 In that case, two gay men signed an
agreement with one man's sister providing that she would carry embryos
created using donated eggs to term and then surrender her parental rights so
that the men could adopt the children.294 Considering itself bound by the Baby
M decision, the court held that the agreement was unenforceable on public
policy grounds and declared the sister and her brother's partner the children's
legal parents.295 As in Baby M, the public policy doctrine served to frustrate the
286. Kesler, 744 A.2d at 795.
287. Id. at 796. The court decided this issue notwithstanding the lower court's factual finding
questioning the existence of the agreement. See id. at 795.
288. Admittedly, these cases arise in different states, so they do not preclude the possibility that
either state would arrive at a more consistent result.
289. Scholars have long criticized the courts' insistence on the two-parent model of parenthood
outside of the contract law context. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 401-02
(2012) (describing the "multiple-parent" literature and its critique of the courts' protection of the
parental rights of only two parents); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REv. 385, 442-43 (2008) (describing the two-
parent model and noting exceptions to the rule).
290. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
291. See id. at 1250 (declaring the agreement void because it "guarantees the separation of a child
from its mother; it looks to adoption regardless of suitability; . . . it takes the child from the mother
regardless of her wishes").
292. Id. at 1234.
293. A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
294. Id.,slipop.at2.
295. Id. at 6.
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plans of the intended parents and to restore one man and one woman as the sole
legal parents. 296
Moreover, the public policy doctrine amounts to a judicial articulation that
the parties' ex ante preferences do not matter even though those preferences
induce conduct by the parties. As the use of reproductive technologies such as
IVF involves significant cost and effort, parties intending to rely on them
engage in at least some deliberation that results in decisions expressing
personal preferences. Agreements providing for the disposition of embryos at
the occurrence of various contingencies-such as the death of one or both
partners, divorce, prior successful fertilization, et cetera-allow the parties to
crystalize their intentions before the IVF process, both for themselves and for
the other party or parties.297 These intentions in turn "set in motion others'
expectations and induce their irreversible reliance." 298 Because the participants
must submit to time-intensive and invasive procedures and cannot be restored
to their precontracting selves if the agreement is not enforced, the ability to
secure specific commitments from each other might be necessary to enjoy the
benefit of the procedure in the first instance. 299 Coupling the ability to choose
one's reproductive outcome with assurances that the consequences of those
choices will follow would better promote individual autonomy.300
It follows that the refusal to enforce these agreements creates legal
uncertainty. Scholars have speculated that uncertainty about the legality of
assisted reproductive technologies may deter their use. 301 A recent empirical
study has found that gay and lesbian adults had diminished confidence about
296. See also A.L.S. v. E.A.G., No. Al0-443, 2010 WL 4181449 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2011)
(preventing a gay male couple from establishing parentage by contract and declaring the surrogate
mother to be the legal mother of the child).
297. See Sara D. Petersen, Comment, Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos upon Divorce: A
Contractual Approach Aimed at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065, 1088 (2003);
Shultz, supra note 92, at 347; see also Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (noting that
enforcement of embryo disposition agreements encourage parties to think about contingencies and make
informed decisions before beginning the process).
298. Shultz, supra note 92, at 366-67.
299. See John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50
EMORY L.J. 989, 1017 (2001); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 96, at 1232 ("A legal regime that
constrains the freedom to commit actually limits individual freedom.").
300. See Shultz, supra note 92, at 302-03.
301. Commentators and courts believe that nonenforcement of certain categories of agreements will
deter their formation. See supra note 104; see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248-49 (N.J. 1988)
(predicting that surrogacy would not survive without payment to surrogates, and then articulating a
public policy against enforcing agreements involving payment); Carbone, supra note 28, at 610
(suggesting that the Baby M decision would deter genetic fathers from pursuing surrogacy arrangements
because of uncertainty as to the outcome). Whether or not this assumption is true in this context as an
empirical matter is beyond the scope of my inquiry here; Robertson, supra note 276, at 355 (noting the
importance of uncertainty as an obstacle to use of ARTs by gays and lesbians). For an in-depth analysis
of whether the subsidization of ARTs affects adoption rates, see 1. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen,
Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates
and Should it Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485 (2010).
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their ability to become parents.302 Indeed, the practical result of the New Jersey
court's invalidation of the gestational surrogacy agreement discussed above
was a protracted custody trial that only placed the children with the intended
parents after several years of litigation.303 For gay men seeking to have
biological children, the burden imposed by the doctrine is particularly acute,
since they are dependent on IVF agreements and surrogates in order to become
biological parents. Through the public policy doctrine, courts emphasize the
importance of biological parenthood to individual fulfillment, yet express
disapproval of the practices necessary to achieve it.304 The public policy
doctrine functions here to trap gay and lesbian family units in a double bind,
encouraged to pursue a social good but denied the legal mechanisms to do so,
at least without difficulty or uncertainty.
Interestingly, single women seeking to bear a genetically related child may
escape regulation by the public policies articulated in the decisions discussed
throughout this Article. Unlike their married or coupled counterparts, they can
mostly avoid the participation of other intimates in decisions concerning
reproduction as long as they can carry the child themselves. The courts that
articulated public policies against the enforcement of embryo disposition
agreements between intimates discussed in Part I suggested that those same
documents would bind patients and their fertility clinics. 305 Moreover, although
single women must rely on donated sperm, sperm donation statutes in several
jurisdictions terminate the donor's parental rights, allowing a single woman to
306be the sole legal parent of the resulting child. Statutes based on the 1973
Uniform Parentage Act in other jurisdictions relieve donors of parental
obligations when the sperm is used by a married woman in a clinical setting,307
302. Rachel G. Riskind, Charlotte J. Patterson & Brian A. Nosek, Childless Lesbian and Gay
Adults' Self-Efficacy About Achieving Parenthood, COUPLE & FAM. PSYCHOL. 19-20 (forthcoming),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2095376.
303. See Lowenstein Sandler Wins Custody Case fbr Same Sex Couple, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 19,
2011, http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/lowenstein-sandler-wins-custody-case-for-same-sex-
couple-135861603.html (describing the trial as "span[ning] more than one year and includ[ing] more
than 30 days in court").
304. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024-25
(1996) (discussing the significance of the expressive function of the law in changing social norms); Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 949-52 (1996) (summarizing the
various tools possessed by the government to influence the development of social norms).
305. See supra note 134.
306. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination ofLegal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 847 & n.52 (2000) (noting that a few states
expressly terminate the parental rights of a sperm donor notwithstanding the marital status of the
intended recipient); Uniform Parentage Act § 702 (2002) (providing that a sperm donor is not the parent
of a child conceived through means of assisted reproduction, and eliminating any reference to the
marital status of the intended user of donated sperm).
307. The Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 provides that "[t]he donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973) (emphasis added). In a
recent, headline-making case, the State of Kansas has sued a donor who personally delivered his sperm
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but they do not expressly restrict the use of donated sperm by single women,
raising at least the possibility that courts could terminate the parental status of
donors regardless of the recipient's marital status or the participation of a
physician. 30 In short, women who seek to rely on intrauterine insemination to
bear a genetically related child in many cases possess the option to do so
unilaterally without the uncertainty imposed by the public policy doctrine. 309
But this loophole in the law, like the public-policy-based decisions
discussed above that sometimes benefit individual female litigants, cannot be
characterized as woman-friendly. Both are based on views about the relative
value of male and female contributions to parenthood that essentialize
motherhood and strengthen the separation between the family and the market.
Although the public policy doctrine affects anyone seeking to enter into an
agreement regarding the use of assisted reproductive technologies, its impact
on gay and lesbian people, in particular, demonstrates how the policies tend to
reinforce traditional family structures at the expense of marginalized ones.
C. Interfering with Innovation
Use of the public policy doctrine to inhibit the development of novel
family structures and interpersonal duties deprives society of potentially
beneficial innovations. In doing so, it lessens the individual freedom of all its
members.
The value of the "traditional family" has been subject to a longstanding
debate310 I do not seek to recapitulate here. Rather, I take as my point of
departure the notion, developed above, that the traditional family has
maintained status hierarchies that have systematically disadvantaged women
to a lesbian couple for recoupment of public benefits paid on the child's behalf when the lesbian parents
split up. See Lizzie Crocker, The Sperm Donor Trap, THE DAILY BEAST, Jan. 10, 2013,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/10/the-sperm-donor-trap-should-your-dna-follow-you-
for-life.html. The relevant Kansas statute uses language derived from the 1973 version of the Uniform
Parentage Act. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f (West 2012). It remains to be seen what effect the
Kansas courts will give to the statutory language requiring the participation of a physician in the
insemination process.
308. Although state statutes differ, several courts have had to decide whether and in what
circumstances their state regimes allowed single women to avoid paternity claims by known sperm
donors. See, e.g., Brown v. D'Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007 WL 4636692, at *8-11 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Dec. 7, 2007) (collecting cases). In a short article commenting on the Kansas case discussed in the
previous footnote, Judith Daar suggests that California's domestic partnership laws, second-parent
adoption for same-sex parents, and recognition of de facto parenthood could all operate to relieve a
sperm donor from parental responsibilities notwithstanding that the state's statutes maintain the licensed
physician requirement. Judith Daar, Is Sperm Donation a Risky Business in California?, DAILY J., Jan.
16, 2013, at 4. Of course, these doctrines would not necessarily benefit a single woman.
309. 1 do not mean to suggest that these women would not face different challenges, either
economic or social, as a result of their decision.
310. The arguments on both sides of this issue are too numerous to catalogue. For a summary of the
debate, see ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER 57-140 (2007).
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and marginalized sexual minorities, 3 11 and that the public policy doctrine has
been complicit in their maintenance and propagation. I therefore seek to
contribute to the recent wave of scholarship critically evaluating the
centralizing role marriage plays in distributing benefits-pertaining to health
care, pensions, immigration status, or tax 312and regulating sexual behavior.313
Kerry Abrams, for example, has demonstrated through her analysis of the
wide array of doctrines addressing marriage fraud that the law asks marriage to
do a tremendous amount of work to distribute economic and legal benefits,
many of which are not necessarily linked to the institution of marriage. 314 The
distribution of benefits in this way fails at times to reach the intended recipients
and tends to disadvantage women and the poor. 315 She has therefore called for
the disaggregation of benefits currently associated with marriage into various
functional categories, some of which could be distributed to individuals directly
or on the basis of other types of relationships.316
Alice Ristroph and Melissa Murray offer another rationale in support of
decentralizing marriage and the regulation of intimacy: that "families are
worthwhile in part because they make totalitarianism less likely."317 Ristroph
and Murray observe the intended role of disestablishment of religion in
preserving "the limits in a system of limited government."318 The development
of a "plurality of authoritative institutions"-including churches, but also
political parties and business and civic associations-supplies the citizenry
with competing claims of authority. 3 19 These competing claims enable people
to reflect on, and perhaps even reject, claims of authority in a way that would
be less likely if the political and ecclesiastical authorities were intertwined.320
311. See Ertman, supra note 30, at 80, 84 (criticizing the "naturalized model of family" as a
"socially constructed norm" that "is often inadequate because it cannot respond to changing forms of
intimate relationships" which in turn perpetuates the "pernicious pattern in law and life that those with
more get more"); Hasday, supra note 27, at 494 (arguing that "legal efforts to denote the sanctity of
intimate relationships by regulating and restricting the exchange of economic resources within them
appear to systematically perpetuate and exacerbate distributive inequality for women and poorer
people").
312. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3, 14-15 (2012) (identifying
the various subjects of public benefits fraud via marriage).
313. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Longing fbr Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2688-89
(2008); Murray, supra note 115, at 5-6 (discussing marriage as a remedy for the crime of seduction);
Rosenbury, supra note 18, at 199.
314. See Abrams, supra note 312, at 55.
315. See id. at 55-60.
316. See id. at 64-66. Nancy Polikoff, Martha Fineman, and others have made similar arguments.
see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-30 (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 123, 126 (2008).
317. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE LJ. 1236, 1238
(2010).
318. Id. at 1242-43.
319. Id. (relying on Alexis de Tocqueville's observations that this institutional pluralism
contributed to the success of America's democracy).
320. Id. at 1243.
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Ristroph and Murray suggest that although families, too, are sites of value
creation and moral development, the state has not similarly promoted
disestablishment of the family from the state; instead, it has promoted a "model
legal family . . . more ideologically specific than a set of general principles
easily acceptable to all members of a democratic society." 321 Ristroph and
Murray therefore call for the disestablishment of the family, including an
extension of exemptions and accommodations to a broader variety of family
forms parallel to religious exemptions and accommodations from generally
applicable laws,322 although they leave for another day the resolution of "the
many practical issues that disestablishment entails." 323
I offer here a third, and more controversial, perspective on decentralization:
Elizabeth Emens's challenge to compulsory monogamy.324 As Emens has
pointed out, monogamy-although traditionally (at least nominally) compelled
by the institution of marriage and the criminal laws prohibiting sexual conduct
outside of it325 -is more of an aspiration than a reality. People are likely to
have multiple sexual partners during the course of their lives due to the failure
of marriages and high rates of re-marriage, and many will have multiple
partners even within the course of a single marriage.326 Moreover, there may be
some beneficial aspects to polyamorous relationships in terms of self-
knowledge, honesty, consent, self-possession, and sexual and intimate
expression.327 Yet polyamory-defined loosely as a relationship in which an
adult intimately loves more than one adult 328-has faced widespread societal
resistance. 329 In her theoretically rich account, Emens describes the many ways
in which the law contributes to the norm of compulsory monogamy, from
marriage restrictions to the lack of protection for nonmonogamous relationships
in the form of antidiscrimination laws and the criminalization of certain types
of sexual conduct. 330 Although she does not mention contract law's complicity
in establishing the norm of monogamy, it seems fairly certain that the public
policy doctrine would impose barriers to the legally enforceable structuring of
at least certain aspects of polyamorous relationships.
321. Id. at 1251.
322. See id. at 1277.
323. Id. at 1278.
324. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence,
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004).
325. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 107, at 1297-98; Murray, supra note 137, at 1268.
326. See Emens, supra note 324, at 297-98 (noting that 40% of marriages end in divorce and 70%
of divorcees remarry); id. at 299 (citing studies estimating that between 20% and 75% of married
spouses commit adultery).
327. See id. at 321 (identifying principles associated by polyamorists with the polyamorous
community).
328. Id. at 303-05 (providing multiple definitions that differ over their inclusion of nonsexual
relationships and sexual relationships between more than two people).
329. Id. at 283.
330. Id. at 361-62.
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Although Ristroph and Murray identify several concerns about relying too
heavily on contract doctrine to perform the act of disestablishment,m many
contracts scholars have shared their goal of creating a plurality of family forms
and obligations through the enforcement of private agreements. Writing several
years after California's famous palimony case, Marvin v. Marvin,332 and
several years before the first municipal governments began recognizing
domestic partnerships for same-sex couples,333 Marjorie Maguire Shultz, one of
the early proponents of this approach, argued that the increasing diversity of
intimate relationships, both as stages on the way to marriage or as accepted
alternatives to it, necessitated "some form of private ordering of conduct and
values," and that "[c]ontract offers a rich and developed tradition whose
principal strength is precisely the accommodation of diverse relationships." 334
To Shultz, contract law's regulation of "those arenas of human interaction in
which the state recognizes and defers to divergent values, needs, preferences,
and resources" makes it ideally suited to legitimize the "pluralistic choices" of
parties to a relationship.335
Although I personally favor recognizing additional forms of intimate
relationships and a more flexible spectrum of intimate duties through the
expansion of status regimes,336 I worry that leaving this project to the
majoritarian process will only continue the process of regulation and
marginalization that has defined American family law since its outset. Thus,
whatever our suspicions about contract law, it must play a role in
disestablishment.
By preventing enforcement of agreements between intimates both inside
and outside of marriage, the public policy doctrine interferes with the creation
and ordering of relationships outside the traditional family model and the
331. Ristroph and Murray identify several distinct dangers in relying too heavily upon the use of
private agreements to create alternative family forms. First, they worry that contracting would invite
state interference in the form of judicial enforcement. See Ristroph & Murray, supra note 317, at 1273-
74. Second, they warn of the danger that the contract paradigm may inculcate norms of economic
privatization and contradict public financial support for caregiving within families. Id. at 1275. Third,
they note that some familial associations (especially the parent-child and sibling relationships) are not
strictly voluntary, making contract law ill-suited to governing those relationships. Id. at 1275-76.
Although some of these concerns could arise if the state mandated private ordering of all family
relationships, none of them, in my view, justifies nonenforcement of private agreements initiated
between competent adults.
332. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
333. Several California municipalities began recognizing domestic partnerships between people of
the same sex in the mid-1980s. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Comment, Reaching Backward While
Looking Forward: The Retroactive Efect of California s Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities
Act, 54 UCLA L. REV. 185, 188 n.7 (2006).
334. Shultz, supra note 30, at 246, 248.
335. Id.; see also Ertman, supra note 30, at 90 (arguing that enforcement of agreements between
intimates would "provide[] a way around majoritarian morality").
336. Recognition of marriage between same-sex individuals is one such example. Caregiving
relationships between mutually dependent adults are another. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 316, at
141-42, 149-52.
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accrual of benefits that disestablishmentarians and contractarians identify. In so
doing, the doctrine foregoes a low-cost opportunity to encourage gentrification
of family law through the creation of plural structures; because courts normally
enforce the private choices of contracting parties, the enforcement of intimate
agreements would not necessarily lend specific contractual terms the
imprimatur of state approval any more so than terms in any other type of
contract.337 Consider for a moment what would happen if courts allowed two
adults to agree to co-parent a child that one of them carried to term.338 The
benefits to that child, who would otherwise not have existed, and the benefits to
the parents from the parent-child relationship would likely exceed any harms to
those involved339 and might allow for the eventual redefinition of what
characteristics of a parent-child relationship society values and protects. 340
To the extent that a plurality of family forms and intimate arrangements
leads to beneficial innovations and serves as a bulwark against unnecessary
governmental intrusions into people's private lives, the public policy doctrine
frustrates these aims. But in addition to imposing these obstacles, the use of
public policy doctrine in the intimate context also reveals strains within the
underlying contract doctrine, problems that I will explore in the next Part.
IV. REVISITING THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
IN THE INTIMATE AGREEMENT CONTEXT
A. Shortcomings of the Public Policy Doctrine
The previous Parts identify harms to individual choice and pluralism
caused by the use of the public policy doctrine to invalidate embryo disposition
agreements and other types of intimate agreements. In this section, I summarize
my critiques of the public policy doctrine in the intimate context and offer
reasons for its abandonment.
337. See Ertman, supra note 30, at 91 ("Generally courts will enforce private agreements even
when moral considerations suggest that they should not.").
338. Cf T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246-47 (Mass. 2004) (involving the formation of an
implied agreement between a lesbian couple to co-parent a future child carried by one of the women).
339. This situation poses what some have called the nonidentity problem-the notion that the net
benefit to a child that otherwise would not have been bom exceeds any harms brought about by his or
her birth. See 1. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 423, 437-38 (2011) (describing the theory of the nonidentity problem and providing examples).
340. President Obama, for example, commented on how his daughters' interactions with children of
same-sex couples emphasized to him the inherent equality of same-sex relationships and led to his
evolution on the issue of marriage equality. Josh Earnest, President Obama Supports Same-Sex
Marriage, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 10, 2012, 7:31 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/05/1 0/obama-supports-same-sex-mariage.
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Indeterminacy. As the cases examined throughout this Article illustrate,
use of the public policy doctrine is often unpredictable and indeterminate.341
That fact is even more glaringly demonstrated by cases not discussed at length
in this Article: those in which different state courts enforce similar agreements
arising in factual contexts that raise similar concerns, sometimes over express
public policy objections.342
Rarely do parties seek to enforce an agreement violating an expression of
positive law in court. Courts considering whether the public policy doctrine
applies therefore face two distinct challenges. First, they must identify the
policy or policies that dictate the result in the case. 343 When no one statute or
judicially crafted policy from the quiver of available options directly applies to
the agreement, this task can become quite complex.344 Practically speaking,
courts often find themselves discerning pronouncements of policy from narrow
or inapt statutes.345 For example, the Baby M court based its holding that New
Jersey public policy forbade paid surrogacy agreements on a repealed statutory
provision governing adoption that expressed a desire "to protect the child from
unnecessary separation from his natural parents" 346 and a statutory provision
treating the rights of parents as equal "regardless of the marital status of the
parents." 347 Although the sentiments expressed in the two statutory provisions
arguably relate to the issue of surrogacy, they did not speak to it directly, nor
did they confront the true purpose of the surrogacy agreement (at least to Mr.
Stem, the intended father): for the Stems to have a child genetically related to
Mr. Stern. 348
341. See, e.g., Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931) ("The
meaning of the phrase 'public policy' is vague and variable; courts have not defined it, and there is no
fixed rule by which to determine what contracts are repugnant to it.").
342. For instance, several state supreme courts have upheld consent forms as valid embryo
disposition agreements, see, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48
P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002) (en banc). Others have upheld gestational surrogacy agreements over public
policy objections, see, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993).
343. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178 cmt. a, 179 cmt. a (1981) (noting the broad
range of legislation-including statutes, ordinances, and administrative regulations-and judicially
created policies that can serve as the basis for a public policy against enforcement).
344. Allan Farnsworth observed that where an agreement involves neither the "commission of a
serious crime or tort" nor a "trivial contravention of policy," the court must perform "a delicate
balancing of factors for and against enforcement of the particular agreement." FARNSWORTH, supra note
99, § 5.1. These factors are set forth in section 178 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The
challenge of discerning the applicable policy has led to the criticism that courts "have gone much further
than they were warranted in going in questions of policy: they have taken on themselves, sometimes, to
decide doubtful questions of policy; and they are always in danger of so doing . Richardson v.
Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P.) 299; 2 Bing. 229, 242 (Lord Best, C.J.).
345. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. b (1981) (recognizing that "even though
a field is the subject of legislation, a court may decide that the legislature has not entirely occupied the
field and may refuse to enforce a term on grounds of a judicially developed public policy even though
there is no contravention of the legislation").
346. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1247 (N.J. 1988) (quoting repealed statutory provision).
347. Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40).
348. See id. at 1235. Cf. Carbone, supra note 28, at 604-09 (criticizing the proffered policy
rationales of the Baby M court as internally inconsistent). The Baby M court also devoted a section of its
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The process of deriving policies from statutes not on all fours with the
agreement at issue is fraught with danger in the context of intimate agreements
because the assumptions upon which public policy decisions rest are highly
contested and subject to change. 349 The policies imposed may not enjoy broad
support, or may burden a party with judgments based on latent stereotypes or
prejudices about groups to which the party belongs. 350 Even at the time of the
Baby M decision, for example, several polls found the public evenly divided on
the legality of surrogacy contracts, or the morality of surrogacy.351
The second challenge courts face is determining the relationship of the
agreement to the policy invoked. Although the agreement might involve
conduct that directly offends a policy, like the commission of a tort, the
relationship between the conduct and policy might instead be quite
352
attenuated. Twenty years after Baby M, for example, a New Jersey trial court
considered the validity of a gestational surrogacy agreement under which a
woman agreed to surrender twins to whom she gave birth but was not
genetically related.353 Baby M voided a traditional surrogacy agreement
because "[i]t guarantees the separation of a child from its mother; it looks to
adoption regardless of suitability; it totally ignores the child; it takes the child
from the mother regardless of her wishes and her maternal fitness; and it does
all of this ... through the use of money." 354 These policy justifications arguably
apply to a gestational surrogacy arrangement just as they applied to the
traditional surrogacy arrangement in Baby M but for one fact, considered
determinative by other state courts: 355 here, the surrogate was not necessarily
opinion to discuss the ways in which the surrogacy agreement conflicted with statutory provisions
regulating (1) the use of money in connection with adoptions, (2) termination of parental rights, and (3)
surrender of custody in private-placement adoptions. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240. Although the court kept
its discussion of these statutes separate from its discussion of New Jersey public policy, these statutory
provisions also do not directly implicate a surrogacy arrangement and therefore had to be interpreted
broadly to apply to the agreement at issue. See Shultz, supra note 92, at 376 ("The court's decision to
apply and even to stretch existing statutory schema to govem the Baby M case assumed or adopted
conventional family design and past procreational experience as models for resolution of disputes that
actually rest on quite different facts.").
349. This fact distinguishes between use of the public policy doctrine in the intimate context and its
use in other contexts in which notions of public good are more stable, such as the rule against price-
fixing agreements.
350. Cf Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 236 (1973) (contending that "when a court justifies a common
law (as distinguished from a statutory or a constitutional) rule with a policy, it is proceeding in a fashion
recognized as legitimate only if two conditions are met: The policy must be widely regarded as socially
desirable and it must be relatively neutral").
351. SUSAN MARKENS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 22
(2007) (citing polls conducted by CBS/The New York Times and U.S. News and World Report).
352. FARNSWORTH, supra note 99, § 5.1; Note, Law and Economics, supra note 104, at 1458
(noting that some agreements, like those to manufacture a product similar to one protected by a patent,
involve uncertain relationships to relevant policies).
353. A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
354. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1988) (emphasis added).
355. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1983) (holding that the intended mother of the
child, in this case the genetic mother, would be the child's legal mother); Culliton v. Beth Israel
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the twins' mother.356 The trial court followed Baby M and held that gestational
surrogacy agreements violated public policy,357 but that result was by no means
preordained.
Unresponsiveness to Rapid Change. Moreover, ideas about the public
good necessarily change over time.358 This fact theoretically requires courts to
recognize new policies and to disregard obsolete ones.359 For example,
recognizing the "radical[]" change in the "mores of society" regarding
cohabitation, demonstrated by the "prevalence of nonmarital relationships in
modem society and the social acceptance of them," the California Supreme
Court abandoned the public policy against enforcing agreements between
unmarried cohabitants in meretricious relationships, paving the way for an
expanded range of permissible agreements between cohabitants.360 But critics
have long bemoaned the fact that outdated policies can overstay their welcome
and ossify into rules of law.361 New Jersey's policy against the enforcement of
surrogacy agreements involving the exchange of money, articulated in the Baby
M decision,362 is arguably one such example of the courts' inability to calibrate
their response to society's changing conditions. As Elizabeth Scott has
demonstrated, the fervor over the potentially coercive aspects of surrogacy
agreements resulted in a moral panic that prompted a flurry of judicial and
legislative condemnation of the practice. 363 But after the dust settled, little
evidence to support the fears of exploitative baby-selling emerged, and people
became more familiar with and accepting of surrogacy.364 It is therefore unclear
that the Baby M court correctly assessed the public good when it decided the
Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1138-39 (Mass. 2001) (approving gestational surrogacy
arrangements).
356. A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
357. Id.
358. Criticizing the nonenforcement of contracts of heirs expectant and reversioner based on public
policy over a century ago, Thomas Breeze argued that "the social fabric may so change that the acts of
individuals which once threatened its well-being may cease to affect it in any particular, and hence the
public policy of the eighteenth may not be the policy of the twentieth century; nor the public policy of
England the policy of America." Breeze, supra note 101, at 228.
359. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 99, § 5.2; Ruggero J. Aldisert, Judicial Declaration of Public
Policy, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 229, 239 (2009) (opining that courts should apply public policies
when there is a consensus and "squeeze out old policies that have lost the consensus they once held").
360. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (holding that express agreements of
cohabitants could be enforced). The Marvin decision itself paved the way for similar decisions by
several other states. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, at 132-35 (noting that "[iun the
decades that followed Marvin, courts in most states ruled that agreements between cohabiting partners
with respect to property or finances were enforceable," but that states placed different limits on such
agreements).
361. See Breeze, supra note 101, at 243 (arguing that "[tihe policy of our people and our times
should control the law of [inheritance] contracts in this country-not the policy of mediaeval and feudal
England"); Note, Marriage, Contracts, supra note 107, at 482 ("The crystallization of a doctrine
allegedly based on 'public policy' into an unyielding rule of law seems unfortunate.").
362. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250, 1264 (N.J. 1988).
363. See Scott, supra note 184, at I17-18.
364. See id. at 138-39 (noting the existence of little evidence that surrogacy causes harm, and many
positive examples of successful surrogacy arrangements).
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case, and it is even less clear that the policy against surrogacy agreements
should persist.
Yet persist it does. Over twenty years after the Baby M decision, the
extension of the policy to invalidate gestational surrogacy agreements365 has
prompted the New Jersey legislature to take up a bill allowing gestational
surrogacy agreements to be enforced in certain circumstances.366 Anecdotal
evidence suggests that attitudes about surrogacy have shifted since the Baby M
decision. For example, although news coverage of issues pertaining to
surrogacy peaked in 1987, when Baby M captured the nation's attention, it had
drastically declined by 1990.367 Similarly, although the state legislative
response in the few years following Baby M was primarily restrictive, by the
3681990s, states were taking a more permissive regulatory approach. High-
profile births involving surrogates have also become relatively common:
celebrities such as Robert De Niro, Nicole Kidman, Sarah Jessica Parker, and
Elton John, to name just a few, have become parents within the last few years
through the assistance of surrogate mothers. 369
The responsiveness of policy to societal changes has been deemed
"essential" to the public policy doctrine, characterized as "a stone in the edifice
of the doctrine, and not a missile to be flung at it."370 But even assuming for the
sake of argument that courts could be perfectly sensitive to the current needs of
the community, that characteristic of the doctrine would raise its own set of
concerns. "[V]arying notions of public expediency" make it difficult to predict
whether certain policies will resolve a particular case,371 and the lack of
predictability interferes with the law's ability to guide conduct372 and people's
ability to arrange their affairs accordingly. 37 3 It follows that in a world of little
change, the public policy doctrine can remain responsive to the interests of the
public and simultaneously guide contracting parties' conduct. In a world of
rapid change, the doctrine will either fail to adapt to changing circumstances,
fail to guide conduct, or both. Especially in areas involving decisions about
365. See, e.g., A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009); see
also Stephanie Saul, New Jersey Judge Calls Surrogate Legal Mother of Twins, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31 surrogate.html.
366. S. 1599, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012); see also Susan K. Livio, Bill that Relaxes NJ.'s Surrogate
Parenting Laws Passes State Senate, N.J. STAR-LEDGER, May 31, 2012,
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/05/billthat-relaxingnjs.surroga.html.
367. See MARKENS, supra note 351, at 20 (demonstrating a drop from 271 articles in three major
newspapers to forty-one).
368. See id.
369. See Sheila Marikar & Luchina Fisher, Five Recent Celebrity Couples Opt for Surrogacy, ABC
NEWS, Dec. 27, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/top-couples-kids-
surrogate/story?id=15235078#.
370. Winfield, supra note 100, at 95.
371. See id.at 89.
372. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW 54 (1964).
373. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 773, 799-802 (2001) (identifying the role of in personam contract rights in the ability to structure
one's affairs with others).
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matters thought to be personal and on which public opinion is divided and
subject to change-intimate relationships, reproduction, and the like-the use
of the public policy doctrine is inadvisable.
Problems with Accountability. These characteristics of the public policy
doctrine-the determinacy or indeterminacy of the relevant policies, the
strength of the agreement's relationship to them, and the extent to which the
public good sought to be protected has changed-have led to longstanding
concerns about its use.374 Uncertainty with respect to any one of these
characteristics can undermine the doctrine's legitimacy.
Under the traditional view, courts will often turn to the public policy
doctrine as a last resort in order to avoid some of these complications and to
protect their legitimacy.375 In theory, if there is some other basis for declining
to enforce an agreement or to arrive at that result, courts will favor that
approach. But the public policy decisions cited throughout this Article suggest
that this assumption is misplaced, at least in the intimate agreement context. In
Baby M, for example, the court chose to articulate a broad policy against paid
surrogacy agreements instead of holding that the agreement had fallen afoul of
the available adoption and custody statutes. In A.G.R., the court refused to
enforce a gestational surrogacy agreement based on the policy articulated in
Baby M without addressing the surrogate mother's arguments about coercion or
lack of bargaining power.377 Both the New Jersey Supreme Court and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court announced public policies against the
enforcement of embryo disposition agreements even after each had held that
the parties in those cases had not executed a binding agreement. 378 Similarly,
374. As discussed in Part II.A. above, the use of the public policy doctrine to invalidate a private
agreement represents a court's determination that its conception of the public good outweighs the
parties' allocation of private goods. It therefore involves a certain amount of legislating from the bench,
even if courts don't always admit to it. For example, Justice Cordy, the author of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court opinion in T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004), in which the court
identified a public policy against enforcement of an agreement by a woman to co-parent a child carried
by her partner, see id. at 1249, accused the court of engaging in judicial activism just a year earlier when
it extended the right of marriage to same-sex couples. Justice Cordy stated in dissent that such a decision
"must be made by the Legislature, not a court." Goodridge v. Dep't ofPub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 983
(Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting). Absent from his opinion in T.F. was any recognition that the court
was, in fact, creating a policy preventing parties from agreeing to share parenting responsibilities in the
absence of any statutory prohibition.
375. See Winfield, supra note 100, at 98 (observing that courts' "apprehens[ion] of the dangers into
which the ill-defined boundaries of public policy may lead them" to "regard public policy as a last resort
for molding the law"); see also 5 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:3 (4th ed. 1990)
("Courts are increasingly sensitive to the need to balance their views concerning what public policy
demands with the need to fix their own limitations, and generally, whenever it is possible, the courts will
interpret a contract so as to uphold it.").
376. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240-50 (N.J. 1988). Of course, a more likely reason the
court could not rely on these statutes is that, as discussed above, they did not directly proscribe the
conduct called for by the agreement.
377. A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07, slip op. at 2-3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2009).
378. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057, 1059 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 714,
720 (N.J. 2001).
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the Iowa Supreme Court chose to articulate a public policy requiring
contemporaneous mutual consent in the disposition of cryopreserved embryos
even though the contract itself required that exact outcome.379 Despite a factual
determination by the trial court that a woman did not promise her former lover
that he would not have to support any child they were to conceive, a
Pennsylvania court nonetheless held that such an arrangement would violate a
public policy against bargaining away a child's support.380
Beyond the expressive harms caused by a judicial articulation that the
381
parties' bargained-for conduct harms the public good, the use of the public
policy doctrine in the intimate context may create uncertainty regarding the
legality of intimate choices and prevent citizens from challenging the
constitutionality of impositions on their rights. If it is true that people have a
right to use assisted reproductive technologies to achieve genetic parenthood, a
position advanced by a prominent scholar, 382 then a law passed by a state
legislature burdening the use of those technologies would be an obvious target
for a constitutional challenge. Although statutes regulating the use of IVF are
relatively rare,383 Louisiana has banned the destruction of embryos created
through the IVF process and imposed upon the donors of genetic material a
duty of care towards the resultant embryos.384 The statute arguably burdens
reproductive decisionmaking by requiring that any person using IVF become a
genetic parent even if she subsequently reconsiders her decision. A person
seeking to use IVF to become a genetic parent but not wanting to implant all
the embryos created through the process or donate the remaining embryos to
other couples, which would result in unwanted births of genetically related
379. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773, 783 (Iowa 2003) (stating that "the present
predicament falls within the general provision governing 'release of embryos,' in which the parties
agreed that the embryos would not be transferred, released, or discarded without 'the signed approval' of
[both spouses,]" but holding that public policy would prevent enforcement of the agreement even as it
mandated the same result).
380. Kesler v. Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 795-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
381. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
382. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 415 & passim (1983) (looking at the Supreme Court's substantive due
process precedents and concluding "that the principles and doctrines espoused ... necessarily protect
some measure of autonomy in bringing children into the world"); John A. Robertson, Embryos,
Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
939, 957-67 (1986) (applying procreative liberty principles to IVF); but see Marsha Garrison,
Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1626 & n.23 (2008) (concluding that courts are
highly unlikely to adopt Robertson's interpretation of procreative liberty, and collecting similar
critiques); Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1457, 1460 (2008) (arguing that there is no general right to use assisted
reproductive technologies, but that measures to limit such use cannot target disfavored groups). This
question is certainly an interesting one, but one that rests outside the scope of this Article.
383. A few states have passed legislation governing embryo donation, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.11 (West 2010); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 556
(West 2009), and others have imposed requirements for contracts involving IVF, see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 742.17 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13-15 (West 2012).
384. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:129, 9:130 (1986).
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children, can therefore bring a lawsuit challenging the law, although that has
not yet been done.
In contrast, a challenge to a state public policy would raise novel issues.
Suppose for purposes of illustration that an Iowa wife wants control of all
embryos created through the IVF process, and her husband, acknowledging her
greater desire to become a parent and her greater sacrifice in participating in the
IVF process, agrees that she should be entitled to possession of the embryos for
all purposes. Aware of the public policy articulated in In re Marriage of Witten,
which says that they cannot agree to such an enforceable arrangement,3 they
are unsure about using IVF in the state, and they think that this uncertainty
infringes their right to procreative liberty. A challenge to this public policy
raises weighty, unresolved questions: would they be able to bring a collateral
challenge as opposed to a direct appeal? Even assuming a collateral challenge
could be brought, additional questions would inevitably arise. To what extent
would the public policy have to be established in the state? Who would be the
proper defendants? 386
The foregoing example rests on the assumption that citizens or their agents
are even aware of policies articulated in the case law and will challenge their
validity. 3 87 But it is likely that the establishment of these public policies might
lead to uncertainty about what is or is not permitted, discouraging individuals
from making decisions that would maximize their fulfillment.388 People in
intimate relationships may not attempt to define their rights and obligations
with respect to each other because of perceptions, perhaps correct, that their
agreements will not be enforced.389 The public policy doctrine therefore casts a
shadow of deterrence larger than the policies themselves; people face
385. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).
386. Frederic Bloom and Christopher Serkin have recently examined the mechanics of suing a
court based on judicial rulings that change the law in the context of judicial takings, but they did not
consider this type of lawsuit. See Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L.
REV. 553 (2012).
387. Several critics have called this assumption into question. See Kostritsky, supra note 104, at
119 n.9 (noting that the assumption that parties are responsive to the legal system "is open to serious
question"). The fact that New Jersey is home to at least twenty-two clinics that report data to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention suggests that the state's public policies against enforcement of
surrogacy agreements and embryo disposition agreements have not had an overwhelming deterrent
effect. See Nat'l Ctr for Chronic Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, 2009 Assisted Reproductive
Technology Success Rates, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 335-56 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2009/PDF/ART 2009_Full.pdf.
388. As John Calfee and Richard Craswell have observed, uncertainty about legal standards,
including the inability to predict where a legal standard will be set, can cause parties "to 'overcomply' or
to 'undercomply'-that is, to modify their behavior to a greater or lesser extent than a legal rule
requires." John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Somte Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984). Although their analysis focuses primarily on economic
activity-which reproductive and other decisions arguably are not-decisions of a personal nature can
affect the happiness and satisfaction of parties to that decision.
389. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 273 (quoting several relationship therapists discussing the
benefits of negotiating expectations between intimate partners, but also reporting the view of "most
lawyers" that such agreements would be unenforceable in court).
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uncertainty not only in assessing the scope of policies adopted by their state
courts, but also in predicting whether their choices may be given effect based
on yet-unannounced policies. In an area where liberty should theoretically be
maximized, this type of regulation is troubling.
B. Addressing Concerns About Offensive Agreements
By arguing that the public policy doctrine should be abandoned in all but a
few situations that I will discuss below, I do not mean to suggest that any and
all agreements between intimates should be enforced, or that states cannot
adopt measures to protect the public welfare. What I suggest is that the public
policy doctrine is rarely a good tool to achieve otherwise laudable aims.
Through the years, scholars have contended that intimate agreements,
especially pertaining to reproduction, harm women. Margaret Jane Radin, a
leading proponent of this view, has criticized the assumption that
"[u]nrestricted choice about what goods to trade represents individual freedom"
as an implicit endorsement of a market ideology that ultimately diminishes
women's human flourishing.390 In particular, some scholars have argued that
reproductive technologies and agreements for their use oppress women by
objectifying their reproductive capacities and appropriating them for the use of
others. 391 Even women who willingly enter such agreements may have been
made victims of preferences imposed by society.392 This argument won the day
in Baby M, in which the court held that the consent of the surrogate mother was
"irrelevant" because of the feared long-term effects of surrogacy contracts,
such as
390. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1861 (1987). Scholars
have continued to question at what point commodification-which exists in virtually all economic
exchange-becomes too serious a problem to allow a particular practice to continue. See, e.g., Martha
M. Ertman, What 's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of
Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. I (2003) (calling for a fuller account of commodification theory that
recognizes different valences of commodification in the particular contexts in which issues may arise);
Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object ofCommodification, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 8 (Martha M. Ertman &
Joan C. Williams ed., 2005) (summarizing the positions of various scholars writing on the subject of
commodification). Although the scope and depth of the commodification debate places it outside of the
scope of this Article, I tend to agree with those scholars who suggest that commodification is not an all-
or-nothing proposition and that not all agreements for the use of reproductive technologies are inherently
suspect on this basis.
391. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 316, at 218-19; Judith Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1741, 1750-51 (1988) (accepting the comparison between surrogacy and prostitution, bribery, and
simony); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 212 n.10 (1995) (collecting
examples of "an extensive feminist literature criticizing new reproductive technologies for objectifying
women and diminishing women's power by appropriating reproductive control").
392. See Polikoff, supra note 95, at 175; Robin L. West, Law's Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
385, 398-99 (2005) (summarizing the feminist/Marxist critique that the preferences of the subordinated
self will reflect the interests of those in the dominant position).
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the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that she is the
offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to obtain money;
[and] the impact on the natural mother as the full weight of her
isolation is felt along with the full reality of the sale of her body and
her child.393
An additional, gender-neutral critique of intimate agreements is that they
involve promises about matters that people cannot predict. Becoming a parent,
entering or exiting a relationship, and raising children are so "personal" and
"delicate" 394 that changes of mind about previous promises must be honored.
Finally, intimate agreements could theoretically contain outrageous terms
or call for performance that courts would be loathe to order or supervise, for
instance, "to do what is necessary to conceive a child or prevent conception."395
These are serious concerns, and intimate agreements may indeed involve
coercion, exploitation, or changes of mind. But use of the public policy
doctrine in this context implies that such agreements generally involve those
aspects, such that arrangements free from coercion are still disallowed and
people can never make rational or valid decisions regarding these matters. In
many instances, these assumptions rest on a flimsy empirical basis; in the
surrogacy context, for example, a vast majority of surrogate mothers do not in
fact experience regret or feel exploited by the relationship.396 Broadly
proclaiming that all such agreements are against the public good therefore
invites the instantiation of gender stereotypes rather than the eradication of
serious process deficiencies.
Although ample literature exists suggesting that people's preferences may
be less than fully rational,39 7 to suggest that these deficiencies apply with
special force in the intimate context conflicts with the broad judicial consensus
that these matters are for individuals rather than courts to decide. 39 8 In the
reproductive context, it also moves the law out of step with the medical field, in
393. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249-50 (N.J. 1988).
394. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2001).
395. Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Mass. 1974) (denying a husband's request for an injunction
preventing his wife from obtaining an abortion).
396. See Appleton, supra note 187, at 292 (noting that most surrogates do not change their minds).
397. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 172-77 (2005) (discussing the limitations of affective forecasting);
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption fom Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (calling on behavioral science
research to question the rational choice theory); Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson, Context-Dependent
Prefrences, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 518 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000)
(discussing the impact of context on decisionmaking).
398. I leave open the possibility that certain types of agreements are more susceptible to forecasting
deficiencies than others. As Glenn Cohen has pointed out, though, none of the studies cited by
opponents of intimate agreements pertaining to the use of reproductive technologies suggest that those
decisions are any more susceptible to error than in other areas in which contracts are enforced. See
Cohen, supra note 122, at 1172-79.
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which doctors perform irreversible medical procedures despite the possibility
of later regret. 399
Moreover, arguments based on the assumption that women share essential
traits contribute to the very patriarchy that these arguments purport to resist.
Over two decades ago, Marjorie Maguire Shultz worried that if gender
differences could justify differential treatment of a man's and woman's
reproductive decisions, "one unfortunate cost of such differentiation would be
its reinforcement of the sexist stereotype that women are ruled by unpredictable
emotion." 400 Others have observed that the women-protective anti-abortion
arguments in Gonzales v. Carhart40 1 have a distinct, emotional valence.402
Justice Kennedy justified the abortion restrictions in that case by pointing to the
"regret," "depression," "loss of esteem," "anguish[,] and sorrow" experienced
403by women making ill-informed abortion decisions. As Courtney Cahill has
recently argued, the disgust that many people feel towards abortion comes from
the challenge the act poses to "widely-held assumptions about the 'essential
nature' of women." 404 Our growing awareness of the negative consequences of
gender stereotypes should counsel caution against the convenient use of a
doctrine that promotes those stereotypes.
I therefore suggest that we turn to legislation or existing contract doctrines
to address problematic intimate agreements. The precise contours of such
proposals deserve far more treatment than I am able to give them here, but I
envision two areas of future inquiry. The first would involve the study of
measures to improve the quality of contracting in the intimate context-such as
informational requirements, representation by separate legal counsel, writing
requirements, fiduciary duties, and more-many of which already exist in the
prenuptial agreement context. 40 The second would look at the way in which
399. For example, female sterilization, a prevalent method of contraception by women, see WILLIAM
D. MOSHER ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, USE OF CONTRACEPTION AND USE OF
FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1982-2002 (2004), may result in rates of self-
reported regret exceeding twenty percent depending on various characteristics. Susan D. Hillis et al.,
Poststerilization Regret: Findings From the United States Collaborative Review of Sterilization, 93
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 889, 892-93 (1999). Nonetheless, ninety-one percent of physicians
reported that they would perform the procedure after informing patients of their concerns. R.E.
Lawrence et al., Factors Influencing Physicians' Advice About Female Sterilization in USA: A National
Survey, 26 HUM. REPROD. 106, 109 (2011).
400. Shultz, supra note 92, at 351-52.
401. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
402. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 187, at 257 (noting the role of regret in the Gonzales decision
and situating it within a discussion of regret in other reproductive contexts); Courtney Megan Cahill,
Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that opposition to
abortion in Gonzales signaled the beginning of a disgust-based rationale for abortion restrictions); Suk,
supra note 187, at 1194-95 (discussing the role of "emotional pain" in the decision).
403. Suk, supra note 187, at 1195, 1198 (internal quotations omitted).
404. Cahill, supra note 402, at 10.
405. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 27.
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existing doctrines, such as unconscionability406 or the mutual assent
requirement, 407 could encourage both procedurally and substantively fair
outcomes and avoid the imposition of ambiguous or unintentional agreements.
CONCLUSION
As this Article recounts, courts have refused to enforce a wide variety of
agreements between intimates. In each instance of nonenforcement, courts
prevent individuals from securing mutual commitments on matters of great
personal importance, introducing uncertainty into those relationships. These
burdens fall hardest on people outside of traditional social norms: gay and
lesbian couples, divorced people, and the polyamorous. They also threaten the
values of autonomy and pluralism that the law has otherwise sought to protect
for us all.
These cases at the intersection of contract law and family law call on
family law scholars to remain vigilant about the ways in which public policies
promoting traditional family structures continue to develop and extend to new
types of family arrangements. And they call on contracts scholars to question
whether the public policy doctrine has broken free from its ideological
moorings.
Decisions relying on the public policy doctrine can sometimes obscure the
courts' endorsement of specific normative positions in neutral-sounding
rhetoric, like the rhetoric of individual freedom. In a classic case of
"protest[ing] too much," 408 the Iowa Supreme Court cautioned against
"substitut[ing] the courts as decisionmakers in this highly emotional and
personal area,"409 even as it prevented parties from entering into enforceable
agreements regarding their frozen embryos and substituted a default rule
virtually guaranteeing their destruction. Revealing the doctrine for what it is
represents the first step towards rolling it back. Courts should be increasingly
hard-pressed to justify encroachment on individual choice through policies that
should have lapsed into desuetude. And as policing of intimate agreements
recedes, new arrangements can teach us what we value about intimacy and
intimate relationships.
406. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmts. a, c (1981) (looking to the "setting,
purpose and effect" of an agreement to root out "weaknesses in the contracting process" or "gross
disparity in the values exchanged").
407. See id. § 17 (stating that with few exceptions, "the formation of a contract requires a bargain
in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent").
408. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2. ("The lady doth protest too much, methinks.").
409. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779 (Iowa 2003).
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